Vladimir Putin is expected to use talks with Xi Jinping in Beijing to press for progress on the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, a project that has become central to Moscow’s attempt to redirect energy exports from Europe to China.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is seeking to revive momentum behind a major gas pipeline to China during talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, as Moscow attempts to secure a long-term outlet for gas once destined for Europe.
The proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline is expected to feature prominently during Putin’s visit to Beijing this week. The project would carry Russian gas from western Siberia to China via Mongolia, with a planned annual capacity of up to 50 billion cubic metres. For Russia, it is one of the most important pieces of energy infrastructure in its post-European export strategy. For China, it is a possible additional source of overland energy supply at a time of renewed concern over maritime routes and Middle Eastern instability.
According to Bloomberg, Moscow hopes turbulence in global energy markets, linked to the war involving Iran and disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, may make Beijing more flexible in negotiations over gas pricing. Russian officials close to the talks have suggested that Chinese counterparts have shown interest in accelerating discussions, although no final breakthrough has yet been reached.
The Kremlin has publicly signalled that the pipeline is on the agenda. Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s foreign policy adviser, said the issue would be discussed seriously during the visit, adding that he expected the two leaders to examine the matter in detail. Putin said earlier this month that Moscow and Beijing had agreed “almost all key issues” concerning gas and oil cooperation, but the commercial terms of Power of Siberia 2 remain the decisive question.
The difficulty for Russia is that China has little reason to hurry unless the terms are favourable. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has become increasingly dependent on China as a trade partner, technology supplier and buyer of energy. Western sanctions and the collapse of much of Russia’s former gas trade with Europe have reduced Moscow’s room for manoeuvre. Beijing, by contrast, has pursued a diversified energy strategy, combining Russian pipeline gas with liquefied natural gas imports, Central Asian supplies and domestic production.
That imbalance has shaped negotiations over Power of Siberia 2 for years. Russia wants the project to compensate for lost European markets and give Gazprom a large, predictable export route. China wants supply security, but has pressed for prices and conditions reflecting Moscow’s weaker position. A recent Reuters overview of Russia-China energy ties noted that Chinese imports of Russian oil and gas have increased since the start of the war, but also that China still receives far less Russian gas than Europe did before 2022.
The existing Power of Siberia pipeline, which began deliveries to China in 2019, is separate from the proposed western route. It supplies gas from eastern Siberia under a long-term contract. Power of Siberia 2 would be more strategically significant because it would connect fields in western Siberia, the same broad resource base that historically underpinned Russian exports to Europe. Its completion would therefore mark a structural shift in Russia’s energy geography.
The timing of Putin’s visit also gives the talks a wider diplomatic significance. Xi is receiving the Russian president shortly after hosting Donald Trump, underlining Beijing’s effort to position itself as a central power in talks involving Washington and Moscow. The Associated Press reported that the visit comes as China seeks to maintain stable relations with the United States while continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with Russia.
For Moscow, the visit is also a demonstration that it is not isolated. The Russian delegation includes senior ministers, deputy prime ministers, the central bank governor and heads of major state corporations. The composition reflects the breadth of Russia’s economic dependence on the relationship with China, from energy and transport to finance and industrial supply chains.
Transport corridors are also expected to form part of the discussions. Russian officials see growing Chinese interest in overland routes through Russia and in the Northern Sea Route across the Arctic. The strategic logic is clear: the more China worries about maritime chokepoints, the more attractive land-based energy and freight routes may become. However, this does not mean Beijing will accept Russian terms on the gas pipeline.
Power of Siberia 2 therefore remains both an energy project and a test of political leverage. Russia needs the deal to support Gazprom, sustain long-term export revenue and reduce the consequences of losing Europe as its main gas market. China can use the same project to obtain discounted supply, strengthen energy security and deepen its influence over Moscow.
A deal would not restore Russia’s previous position in the European gas market. Nor would it remove the costs of sanctions, war expenditure and reduced access to Western finance and technology. But it would confirm that Moscow’s energy strategy is being reoriented eastwards, with China as the indispensable buyer.
For Xi, the calculation is different. Supporting Russia too openly carries diplomatic costs with Europe and the United States. Yet securing additional Russian gas at favourable prices would serve China’s long-term economic and strategic interests. That is why the pipeline may advance, but only on terms shaped more by Beijing’s bargaining power than by Moscow’s urgency.
