The G7 summit opening in Evian-les-Bains next week is being shaped less by the formal agenda than by two wars and one political constraint: how far Europe can maintain unity when Donald Trump’s foreign policy priorities are now central to the room.
France will host the summit from June 15 to 17 on the French side of Lake Geneva. The meeting was intended to project cohesion among the world’s leading industrial democracies, but the context has changed sharply. The war in Iran, Russia’s continued war against Ukraine, pressure on energy markets, and renewed tension over China have moved the summit from routine diplomacy into crisis management.
Paris has already adjusted the meeting around the American president. The summit dates were arranged in part to accommodate Trump’s domestic schedule, while the agenda has been shaped to avoid direct confrontation where possible. The result is a gathering in which European leaders will try to preserve a common front, while also limiting the risk of a public rupture with Washington.
The problem is that the issues facing the G7 do not lend themselves to polite management. The conflict with Iran has already affected oil prices, shipping risk and European inflation expectations. The possible disruption of trade through the Strait of Hormuz has direct consequences for European consumers and governments, particularly after the European Central Bank raised interest rates in response to renewed inflation pressure.
That makes the Middle East more than a foreign policy issue for Europe. It is now an economic one. Higher energy costs can feed into transport, manufacturing, food prices and public finances. European leaders attending the G7 will therefore be discussing Iran not only as a security crisis, but as a source of domestic political pressure.
Ukraine presents a different but equally difficult test. European governments continue to support Kyiv, but the diplomatic track has become more complicated since Trump’s return to the White House. Several European capitals are concerned that any US-led negotiation with Moscow could place pressure on Ukraine to accept terms that suit Washington’s timetable rather than Europe’s security interests.
That concern is one reason why Ukraine will loom over the summit even if the formal communiqués are carefully worded. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to use the meeting to press for further support at a time when European states are already being asked to raise defence spending, strengthen air defence and prepare for a longer war. The issue is not only how much assistance Ukraine receives, but who defines the diplomatic framework around any future settlement.
This has opened a wider debate inside Europe over representation. Italy and Poland have both questioned smaller diplomatic formats dominated by Britain, France and Germany. Giorgia Meloni has called for a single European voice in talks with Russia, while Donald Tusk has objected to Poland’s exclusion from key discussions. The debate over who speaks for Europe is not procedural. It reflects concern that decisions affecting the whole continent could be shaped by a narrow group of capitals.
The G7 will also face a more structural question: whether the format still has sufficient authority to coordinate policy in a fractured international system. The group remains important because it brings together the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the European Union. Yet its influence has weakened as China, India, Gulf states and other powers have gained economic and diplomatic weight.
France has invited several non-G7 countries, including India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Kenya and South Korea. That wider guest list reflects a practical reality. The G7 cannot manage global energy, minerals, supply chains or sanctions enforcement without countries outside the old Western core.
China will remain part of the discussion even without being in the room. Trump has signalled that he wants to raise critical minerals, artificial intelligence and global economic imbalances. These issues matter to Europe because they touch on industrial policy, technology dependence and the vulnerability of supply chains. They also expose a familiar tension: Europe wants to reduce dependence on China, but it does not always share Washington’s preferred methods.
Security around the summit adds another layer of pressure. France and Switzerland have agreed exceptional measures around the border region, with Swiss troops deployed to support summit security. The operational preparations underline the political sensitivity of holding a major leaders’ meeting during simultaneous crises.
The likely outcome is not a grand strategic settlement. Diplomats expect shorter, targeted statements rather than a single sweeping declaration. That may be realistic. The G7 is trying to manage urgent crises while its members disagree on trade, Iran, Ukraine, China and the limits of American leadership.
For Europe, the summit is therefore a test of discipline. Leaders will need to show that they can work with Washington without surrendering European interests, support Ukraine without losing control of the diplomatic track, and respond to the Iran conflict without allowing an energy shock to dictate domestic policy.
The risk for the G7 is that it becomes a stage for managing Trump rather than managing crises. The risk for Europe is larger: that decisions affecting its security and economy are made around it, rather than with it.
