Vladimir Putin’s latest visit to Beijing underlined the political symbolism of Russia-China ties, but produced no major breakthrough on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing has reinforced the public alignment between Moscow and Beijing, but it has not delivered the major economic breakthrough the Kremlin has long sought.
Putin met Chinese President Xi Jinping shortly after US President Donald Trump’s own visit to China, placing Beijing at the centre of a carefully staged sequence of high-level diplomacy. For Xi, the choreography allowed China to present itself as a power courted by both Washington and Moscow. For Putin, the visit offered a chance to demonstrate that Russia is not isolated, despite Western sanctions and its continuing war against Ukraine.
Yet the substance of the visit appears more limited than the ceremony surrounding it. The two leaders oversaw the signing of multiple cooperation documents, but the most significant unresolved issue — the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline — remained without a final deal. The Kremlin said there was a general understanding on the project, but key questions, including pricing and timetable, have not been settled. No formal oil or gas agreement was announced during the visit.
Putin Seeks China Gas Deal as Russia Looks Beyond Lost European Market
Power of Siberia 2 is central to Moscow’s long-term energy strategy. The proposed route would carry up to 50 billion cubic metres of gas a year from Russia’s Yamal fields to China via Mongolia. For Russia, the project would help offset the loss of European gas markets after the invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent reduction in energy ties with the EU. For China, however, the project is one option among several, giving Beijing leverage over price and conditions. A Reuters explainer on Russia’s planned Power of Siberia 2 pipeline sets out why the project has become strategically important for Moscow, but also why Beijing has been able to move at its own pace.
That imbalance was visible throughout the visit. Russia needs Chinese purchases of oil, gas, technology and industrial components more urgently than China needs new commitments to Russia. Beijing has benefited from discounted Russian energy and wider access to Russian raw materials, but it has avoided placing itself under unnecessary dependence on Moscow.
The political message was nevertheless clear. Xi and Putin used the Beijing meeting to display continuity in their strategic partnership and to criticise US policy. According to Reuters reporting on the Beijing talks, their joint statement included criticism of President Trump’s missile shield plan, while both leaders presented their relationship as a counterweight to American influence.
The visit appeared primarily ceremonial. Putin went to Beijing not to announce a major new agreement, but to reinforce Xi’s geopolitical standing after Trump’s visit and to preserve Russia’s access to Chinese economic support. The lack of substantive new deals also underlined the limits of Moscow’s bargaining position.
That interpretation is consistent with the absence of a major gas breakthrough. Moscow has spoken for years about Power of Siberia 2 as a strategic project, but repeated discussions have failed to produce a final commercial agreement. The current visit again produced language of cooperation, rather than the binding terms Russia needs.
The timing also matters. Xi received Putin after Trump, allowing Beijing to emphasise that both the United States and Russia must engage with China. This does not necessarily make Xi a mediator between Washington and Moscow, but it strengthens China’s image as a central diplomatic actor. Putin’s participation served that Chinese narrative, while giving Moscow the appearance of continued great-power relevance.
For Russia, the visit also had a domestic purpose. Russian state media presented the meeting as evidence that Moscow retains powerful partners. Such imagery is important for the Kremlin at a time when sanctions continue to restrict Russia’s access to Western markets and technology.
For China, the calculation is different. Beijing can maintain close ties with Moscow, buy Russian energy, and oppose aspects of US policy, while still avoiding commitments that would reduce its bargaining position. The lack of a Power of Siberia 2 deal suggests that China remains willing to support Russia politically, but not necessarily on Moscow’s preferred economic terms.
The visit therefore highlighted both the strength and the limits of the Russia-China partnership. Politically, Putin and Xi continue to present a united front. Economically, however, the relationship is increasingly asymmetric. Russia needs China as a buyer, supplier and diplomatic shield. China can afford to wait.
