President Donald Trump’s May 2025 tour of Gulf Arab states has underscored a stark geopolitical reality: Israel no longer holds the unique strategic position in Washington it once enjoyed.
Instead, Trump’s transactional, economically-driven foreign policy has repositioned Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar as primary partners in the region—leaving Israel struggling to redefine its value in the evolving framework of U.S. interests.
Trump’s approach, as detailed in a report by Politico’s senior foreign affairs correspondent Nahal Toosi, hinges on what nations can deliver materially to the United States. In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia pledged $600 billion in investments, including a $142 billion arms procurement deal with American defence firms. Qatar and the UAE are expected to offer similarly substantial commercial benefits. The underlying message: those who can contribute most to Trump’s economic agenda will receive preferential treatment.
Israel, by contrast, has no oil wealth and cannot offer major investment packages or large-scale defence purchases. Its key assets—intelligence cooperation, military technology such as the Iron Dome, and longstanding political ties in Washington—are increasingly seen as secondary. Trump’s foreign policy is dominated by “deals, deals, and more deals,” and the current Israeli government has little to offer that fits this model.
Humour in Israeli social media reflected the discomfort. As Qatar reportedly considered gifting Trump a luxury aircraft, Israelis joked about offering him a parking space in Tel Aviv’s notorious traffic. The quip masked a deeper unease: Trump’s affection seems tied not to values or history, but to financial gain.
Netanyahu’s government appears to recognise the shift. According to reports in Israeli media, the Prime Minister has discussed reducing dependency on U.S. military aid—currently $4 billion annually—as a potential way to align more closely with Trump’s vision of self-reliant allies. The U.S.–Israel Memorandum of Understanding on defence support expires in 2028, and its renewal now seems likely to come with conditions that are more commercially than strategically oriented.
Former U.S. ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro noted that Israeli officials must now prepare for a more “transactional” relationship, where future aid and cooperation will depend heavily on what Israel can deliver for American interests. In practice, this means Israel may be expected to direct more of its own defence spending to U.S. manufacturers, or to contribute more visibly to Trump’s domestic or international initiatives.
Symbolism has also played a part in the perceived downgrade of Israel’s status. Trump’s itinerary excluded Jerusalem entirely—an omission that would have provoked outrage under any other U.S. administration. Moreover, decisions such as lifting sanctions on Syria to please Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman, were made without consulting Israeli officials. Trump’s remark—“Oh, what I do for the crown prince”—was seen in Jerusalem as further proof that Arab leaders are now his preferred interlocutors.
The personal dynamics between Trump and Netanyahu have also cooled. During his first term, Trump took a number of steps that pleased the Israeli right, including relocating the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. This time, however, his actions have reportedly blindsided and frustrated the Israeli leadership. These include re-entering indirect nuclear talks with Iran, proposing a civil nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia without conditioning it on normalisation with Israel, and pursuing ceasefire arrangements with Houthi rebels that exclude protection for Israeli targets.
Internally, Netanyahu faces pressure from far-right coalition partners who were emboldened by Trump’s suggestion that Gaza could be cleared and redeveloped into a resort. The comment, though likely rhetorical, has been taken seriously by extremists, complicating Netanyahu’s efforts to manage both the war in Gaza and international expectations. Trump’s remark—interpreted by some as a call to displace Gaza’s population—was denounced abroad as a violation of international law. But for Israel’s hardliners, it was read as tacit approval for maximalist policies.
Behind closed doors, Israeli officials admit to growing frustration. According to Politico, some have privately labelled Trump “unpredictable” and “annoyed” by Israel’s constant demands. Yet few are willing to speak publicly, for fear of antagonising a president known for punishing perceived disloyalty. Comparisons have been made to Trump’s public falling-out with Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy—an outcome Netanyahu is keen to avoid.
The Israeli government’s challenge is thus twofold: to maintain strategic relevance in Washington while navigating Trump’s demand for immediate economic or political benefit. Options under discussion include pledging that future Israeli defence procurements will favour U.S. suppliers, offering deeper cooperation in areas like missile defence, and potentially even aligning with Trump’s push for a domestic “Iron Dome” system for the United States.
Despite these efforts, the contrast between Trump’s lavish reception in Gulf capitals and Israel’s marginalisation has been stark. Gulf leaders have rolled out royal treatment, from luxury accommodations to personal business deals, positioning themselves as indispensable partners. In comparison, Israel offers strategic depth but little commercial value.
The broader implications of this shift are significant. If the U.S.–Israel relationship becomes increasingly conditional on financial return, other longstanding American alliances may come under similar pressure. Democracies unable to match the Gulf’s financial clout may find themselves sidelined in favour of wealthier, less democratic actors.
In this new landscape, Israel must not only redefine its appeal to Washington but also come to terms with a U.S. president whose loyalties are guided not by shared values, but by perceived return on investment. As Trump’s second term unfolds, the question is no longer what America will do for Israel—but what Israel can do for Trump’s America.
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