Avoiding both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb turns a regional maritime crisis into a global capacity problem: ships travel farther, burn more fuel and complete fewer deliveries.
The simultaneous risk around the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb is forcing oil traders to consider routes that can add roughly a month at sea and millions of dollars to a tanker voyage.
The precise cost varies with vessel size, charter rates, speed, fuel price, insurance and waiting time. A widely cited estimate of about $2.5 million per journey should therefore be read as a scenario, not a fixed surcharge.
The underlying economics are unambiguous. A tanker that cannot use the normal Gulf and Red Sea routes must travel farther, remain employed longer and consume more fuel. That reduces the number of annual voyages the global fleet can perform even if no ship is physically lost.
EU Global has reported how tankers turned back amid attacks around Hormuz. The next-order effect is not merely delayed cargo. It is a reduction in effective transport capacity that can raise freight costs across routes far from the original conflict.
Two chokepoints, one extended route
Hormuz is the maritime exit from the Gulf. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, providing access to the Suez Canal. Disruption at either chokepoint forces difficult choices; avoiding both removes the shortest western route for much Gulf production.
Saudi Arabia has an important partial alternative in its East-West pipeline, which carries crude from the producing region to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. That can bypass Hormuz. But cargo loaded at Yanbu still faces the Bab el-Mandeb risk if it sails south, while a northbound journey depends on the Red Sea and Suez route being usable.
Pipeline capacity is also not equivalent to the total volume normally exported through Gulf terminals. Maintenance, grades of crude, storage, terminal scheduling and domestic demand constrain how much traffic can be shifted.
When both maritime exits are treated as unsafe, vessels may need to navigate around the Cape of Good Hope or use less direct combinations of pipeline and sea transport. Each diversion changes arrival dates and refinery planning.
How the cost builds
A tanker voyage has time-based and distance-based costs. Charter hire or the opportunity cost of an owned vessel accrues each day. Fuel consumption rises with distance and speed. Crew, provisions and maintenance continue. Insurance premiums may increase even when a ship avoids the highest-risk zone, because the broader voyage remains connected to a conflict-affected trade.
Longer journeys also create schedule risk. A refinery expecting a cargo on a particular date may need to draw inventories, purchase a replacement shipment or reduce throughput. If many buyers act simultaneously, spot prices and freight rates can rise.
The calculation is not linear. Vessel speed can be reduced to save fuel, but that extends the charter. Increasing speed shortens time but dramatically raises consumption. Owners choose according to freight terms, bunker prices and delivery urgency.
Canal tolls may be saved when a vessel goes around Africa, but that saving is usually outweighed by extra distance and time. Congestion at alternative terminals can add further delay.
Effective fleet capacity
The most important market effect is “ton-mile” demand: the volume of cargo multiplied by the distance carried. If the same quantity of oil travels much farther, more ship-days are required.
A vessel occupied for 48 days cannot perform another voyage during that period. Across dozens of cargoes, the diversion functions like a reduction in fleet supply. Charter rates can rise even when the number of seaworthy tankers is unchanged.
That pressure spreads unevenly. Very large crude carriers, Suezmax tankers and smaller regional vessels serve different terminals and routes. A shortage in one class cannot always be solved by substituting another because ports have draft and berth limits.
Longer routes also complicate sanctions compliance. Cargo ownership, ship-to-ship transfers, insurance and documentation may change during an extended voyage. Traders and banks will demand clearer records, especially where Russian or Iranian oil could be blended or misdeclared.
Europe and Asia compete for flexibility
European refiners are exposed through fuel prices and replacement demand. If Middle Eastern cargoes arrive later, buyers may seek barrels from the Atlantic Basin, West Africa or the Americas. Asian refiners may compete for the same flexible supply.
The result is not necessarily a physical shortage. Markets can rebalance through price, inventories and changed refinery runs. But the adjustment transfers money from consumers and refiners to transport, insurance and alternative suppliers.
Strategic stocks can absorb a temporary disruption. They should not be used to disguise a lasting transport constraint. Governments need common criteria for releases and a credible plan for replenishment.
The limits of infrastructure resilience
Saudi export pipelines and Red Sea terminals demonstrate the value of route diversity, but they also show why redundancy must be assessed under combined failures. Infrastructure designed to bypass one chokepoint may still depend on another.
Investment decisions should examine terminal protection, storage, repair capacity and interoperability between grades. Commercial operators should test contracts for delay, force majeure and rerouting responsibilities before a crisis.
Naval protection can reduce attack risk, but it cannot guarantee safe passage against every missile, drone, mine or seizure attempt. Convoys may also slow traffic and concentrate targets.
The practical response is a portfolio: maritime security, alternative pipelines, inventories, diversified suppliers and transparent market information.
The headline estimate—an extra month and roughly $2.5 million—captures the scale but not the full consequence. The greater cost comes when longer voyages absorb vessels, disrupt refinery schedules and force buyers into simultaneous competition for alternatives.
Two narrow waterways can therefore influence a global market without being completely closed. Risk alone changes routes; routes change capacity; and capacity changes price. That is how a regional security crisis reaches fuel consumers thousands of kilometres away.
