The European Union and the United States are expected to sign a preliminary memorandum on critical minerals, as both sides seek to strengthen supply chains for materials used in clean technology, defence, digital systems and advanced manufacturing.
The European Union and the United States are expected to sign a preliminary memorandum of understanding on critical minerals, in a further step towards closer transatlantic cooperation on strategic supply chains.
The document is expected to be signed on 24 April by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič. The agreement is intended to establish a framework for cooperation across the critical minerals value chain, including production, processing and supply security.
The expected signing follows confirmation from the US State Department that both sides are moving towards a preliminary partnership. The agreement is not a full trade deal, but it would set a basis for further work between Brussels and Washington on materials considered essential for industrial, technological and defence production.
Critical minerals are used in batteries, renewable energy systems, semiconductors, electric vehicles, aerospace, telecommunications and defence technologies. They include materials such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, manganese, rare earth elements and other inputs that are difficult to replace in modern manufacturing.
For the EU, the proposed partnership fits within a wider attempt to reduce vulnerability in strategic supply chains. The Critical Raw Materials Act sets targets for extraction, processing and recycling inside the bloc, while also seeking to diversify supply from trusted external partners.
The Act requires the EU to strengthen domestic capacity while ensuring that, by 2030, no more than 65 per cent of the Union’s annual consumption of any strategic raw material at the relevant stage of processing comes from a single third country. This target reflects concern over excessive concentration in parts of the global minerals supply chain.
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The United States has similar concerns. Washington has increased its focus on critical minerals because of their role in advanced manufacturing, clean energy, battery supply chains and defence production. The proposed memorandum with the EU is therefore part of a wider economic-security agenda rather than a narrow commodities agreement.
China remains central to the strategic calculation. It dominates several stages of the global rare earths and critical minerals supply chain, particularly processing and refining. For both Brussels and Washington, the issue is not only access to deposits, but also control over midstream processing, pricing, standards, refining capacity and downstream industrial use.
The EU has already pursued critical raw materials partnerships with several countries, including Ukraine, Canada, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Argentina, Chile, Greenland, Norway, Rwanda, Serbia, Australia and Uzbekistan. These agreements are intended to support investment, sustainability standards, infrastructure, research and integration of value chains.
A transatlantic memorandum would differ in character. The United States is not primarily being treated as a supplier state in the same way as many resource-rich partners. Instead, cooperation is likely to focus on coordinating policies, investment, financing tools, standards, project identification and supply-chain resilience.
The timing is also significant. The EU has been seeking to build a more coherent industrial strategy in response to competition over clean technologies, battery production and advanced manufacturing. Critical raw materials are a limiting factor in many of those sectors. Without secure and affordable supplies, industrial policy objectives become harder to deliver.
The proposed memorandum also has implications for defence industry. Many critical minerals are used in precision systems, sensors, electronics, aircraft, missiles and other military technologies. Europe’s effort to increase defence production after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has drawn greater attention to the materials needed to sustain industrial output.
The EU and the United States have previously sought to align parts of their critical minerals policy. A joint statement issued in February after a critical minerals ministerial with Japan set out an intention to accelerate cooperation on supply-chain resilience. That earlier statement pointed to the need for practical partnerships rather than general declarations of intent.
The expected memorandum comes against the background of a broader EU-US trade relationship that has been unsettled by tariff disputes and industrial-policy competition. Critical minerals offer one area where both sides have overlapping interests, even if they continue to differ on other trade issues.
For Brussels, a partnership with Washington may also help strengthen the EU’s bargaining position in global raw-materials markets. The EU remains dependent on imports for many strategic inputs and has limited domestic mining and processing capacity. Joint work with the United States could improve project financing, create larger demand signals and support alternatives to dominant suppliers.
However, the agreement should not be overstated. A memorandum of understanding does not itself create mines, refineries or processing capacity. It does not guarantee supply, reduce prices or remove regulatory and permitting barriers. Its value will depend on whether it leads to identifiable projects, financing decisions, supply contracts and alignment between industrial users.
There is also a timing challenge. Developing new extraction and processing capacity can take years. The EU’s 2030 targets under the Critical Raw Materials Act are already close in policy terms, while demand for batteries, grids, digital systems and defence technologies continues to grow.
The immediate significance of the expected signing is therefore political and strategic. It signals that Brussels and Washington intend to treat critical minerals as an economic-security issue requiring structured cooperation. The practical test will be whether the memorandum produces a roadmap, project pipeline and financing mechanisms capable of reducing supply-chain concentration.
If signed as expected, the agreement would add another layer to the EU’s external raw-materials strategy. It would also show that, despite wider trade tensions, the EU and the United States still see strategic supply chains as an area where coordination is preferable to fragmentation.
