A new round of indirect negotiations involving Russia, Ukraine, and the United States is scheduled to take place in Saudi Arabia next weeks.
The talks are expected to follow a format of “shuttle diplomacy”, with US mediators conducting separate meetings with the respective delegations, who will remain in different rooms of the same venue.
The negotiations come amid continued hostilities and renewed missile strikes on Ukrainian cities, including Odesa. Despite this, the upcoming discussions are seen as a possible step toward identifying the conditions under which a ceasefire might be feasible. There has been no official confirmation of the meeting format from the Saudi hosts, but US officials are reportedly preparing to act as intermediaries between the parties.
According to sources familiar with the matter, the United States has been pressing for a complete cessation of hostilities rather than a limited or sector-specific ceasefire. Initial Ukrainian proposals reportedly included the possibility of a partial ceasefire focused on protecting critical infrastructure. However, Washington is understood to have rejected that approach in favour of a comprehensive halt to fighting.
The broader context of the talks includes a reported recent phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Following that conversation, statements emerged suggesting that both sides may agree to avoid attacks on energy infrastructure—an arrangement some observers interpret as a de facto, if limited, ceasefire. This has led to speculation that Moscow may be attempting to shape the agenda in ways that serve its strategic interests while avoiding formal concessions.
The United States is believed to have three primary objectives. Firstly, to secure a full ceasefire that can be presented as a diplomatic success, possibly aligning with key dates on the political calendar, such as Easter. Secondly, to initiate a separate track of engagement with Russia on wider geopolitical issues unrelated to Ukraine, including energy markets and regional security arrangements. Thirdly, to shift the long-term responsibility for Ukraine’s reconstruction and security to European allies, while retaining strategic leverage over key assets and outcomes.
This approach has prompted concern that a separation could emerge between Ukraine-related negotiations and wider US-Russian dialogue. There is also speculation that Washington may consider a model resembling the West’s historical stance on the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States—non-recognition of annexation, but de facto tolerance of control.
A recent bipartisan resolution introduced in the US Congress reaffirming support for Ukraine’s sovereignty within its 1991 borders appears designed to counter such perceptions. The resolution, while not binding, signals continued political backing for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, even as some US officials reportedly explore compromises that would involve a long-term non-recognition stance toward Russian-held territories.
There are fears that the Kremlin may seek to use any ceasefire agreement as a means of cementing its hold over occupied areas. In early March, Russian authorities issued a directive requiring all residents of occupied Ukrainian territories to obtain Russian documentation by September, with the threat of deportation for non-compliance. This move is widely interpreted as an attempt to integrate those regions more deeply into Russia’s administrative and legal systems.
In parallel, discussions have surfaced around a potential “Baltic model” scenario, under which the West would maintain formal non-recognition of Russia’s control, while allowing normalisation of economic and cultural engagement with those territories. Such an arrangement would fall short of legal recognition but could, in practice, undermine existing sanctions and open the door to commercial and personal exchanges.
Observers note that such a scenario would amount to the effective legalisation—though not the legal recognition—of Russian occupation. While Western governments may maintain formal positions on Ukraine’s sovereignty, enforcement of restrictions on travel, trade, and investment in these areas could weaken or disappear.
The role of European states remains uncertain. The EU is not formally represented in the upcoming Saudi talks. However, European governments are likely to face pressure to respond to any arrangement reached between the US, Russia, and Ukraine. If the outcome involves a shift in the status of occupied territories or a redefinition of Ukraine’s security guarantees, the EU will be forced either to align with or distance itself from the emerging framework.
The question of international presence on Ukrainian territory in any future post-ceasefire scenario may also arise. While Russia may insist on limiting Western involvement, especially in military and security cooperation, European governments are expected to continue supporting Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. The extent to which they will do so—particularly if a US-Russia understanding bypasses European input—remains a key point of concern in Brussels and other European capitals.
The negotiations on 23 March will be closely scrutinised not only for their immediate outcomes but also for signs of longer-term shifts in the structure of international engagement with the war in Ukraine.
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