Chinese President Xi Jinping’s arrival in Pyongyang for talks with Kim Jong Un marks more than a symbolic revival of China-North Korea ties. It is also a test of Beijing’s ability to manage a nuclear-armed neighbour that has gained new leverage through its closer relationship with Russia.
Xi arrived in North Korea on Monday for his first visit to the country in seven years. He was received with a formal ceremony in Pyongyang, including a red-carpet welcome, a gun salute and national anthems at Kim Il Sung Square. The visit is Xi’s first foreign trip of the year and comes at a point when the balance within the China-North Korea relationship has become less straightforward than in the past.
For decades, China has been North Korea’s main political and economic backer. Beijing has used that position to preserve influence on the Korean Peninsula, limit instability on its border and maintain a strategic buffer against the United States and its allies. But Pyongyang’s relationship with Moscow has expanded rapidly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, giving Kim an alternative source of diplomatic and military support.
That shift matters for Europe. North Korea is no longer only a regional security problem for South Korea, Japan and the United States. Its support for Russia, its expanding weapons programme and its role in a wider anti-Western alignment now connect the Korean Peninsula directly to the European security environment.
Xi’s visit followed an article published in North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun in which he said China and North Korea should work together against “hegemony” and attempts to revive militarism. The language was directed at the United States and its allies, but the timing also suggested that Beijing wants to reassert itself as Pyongyang’s principal external partner at a moment when North Korea has been drawing closer to Russia.
The relationship between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin has changed North Korea’s diplomatic position. Moscow and Pyongyang signed a mutual defence agreement in 2024, and North Korea has supplied support to Russia during the war against Ukraine. That cooperation has allowed Pyongyang to present itself not as an isolated state asking for Chinese protection, but as a military actor with value to another major power.
For Beijing, that creates both an opportunity and a problem. China benefits from a North Korea that complicates American and allied planning in East Asia. It also benefits from a Pyongyang that supports China’s opposition to US-led regional security structures. But an emboldened North Korea, more closely tied to Moscow and less dependent on Beijing, is harder for China to control.
The nuclear issue adds another layer. North Korea has repeatedly rejected denuclearisation as a realistic negotiating objective and has continued to expand its weapons capability. Specialist analysis ahead of Xi’s visit argued that Pyongyang may now be seeking a clearer signal that Beijing understands denuclearisation is no longer viable as a policy demand, or even tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status.
That would be a significant shift. China has traditionally supported the formal goal of denuclearisation while opposing instability, sanctions pressure that could weaken North Korea, and any US-led military build-up in the region. If Beijing moves too close to accepting North Korea’s nuclear position, it risks further weakening the non-proliferation framework and increasing pressure on South Korea and Japan to reassess their own defence options.
At the same time, Xi is unlikely to press Kim publicly in a way that could expose division. The visit has been framed around friendship, history and common opposition to external pressure. It is designed to show unity, not disagreement. But beneath the ceremony, the strategic question is whether China can still shape North Korea’s choices, or whether it is now adapting to them.
The implications extend beyond Asia. North Korea’s closer alignment with Russia has added another strand to the security challenge facing Europe. Any further military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow could affect the war in Ukraine, Russian weapons production, missile development and sanctions enforcement. It also complicates European diplomacy towards China, because Beijing cannot easily separate its relationship with Pyongyang from the wider contest over Russia’s war and US alliance structures.
Xi’s visit therefore carries a message in several directions. To Washington, it signals that China remains central to any discussion of the Korean Peninsula. To Moscow, it shows that Beijing does not intend to leave Pyongyang entirely inside Russia’s orbit. To Seoul and Tokyo, it confirms that China will continue to treat North Korea as a strategic partner despite its nuclear programme. To Europe, it is another sign that the conflicts and alignments shaping the Indo-Pacific increasingly overlap with the security consequences of Russia’s war.
The outcome of the visit may not produce a dramatic public agreement. Its significance lies in the setting. A Chinese leader is returning to Pyongyang after seven years, at a time when North Korea has more options, more weapons and more geopolitical value than before. Beijing may still be Pyongyang’s most important partner, but it is no longer the only one that matters.
