The Trump administration is again exploring ways to bring Greenland under United States control, reviving an idea Donald Trump first raised during his first term and returning to within days of beginning his second.
The renewed focus has unsettled Denmark and prompted fresh questions inside NATO about how the alliance would respond to pressure on the territory of a member state.
The debate has been sharpened by Washington’s recent use of force abroad. On 3 January, the US Defence Department said American forces carried out an overnight operation in Caracas that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. The raid has been cited by some analysts as evidence that the White House is prepared to take high-risk actions to achieve political objectives.
Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. It has its own government and parliament, while Copenhagen retains responsibility for foreign affairs and defence. US interest is long-standing and grounded in geography: Greenland sits astride the North Atlantic and the Arctic approaches between North America and Europe, and hosts the US Pituffik Space Base, a key site for missile warning and space surveillance. The United States already operates there under a 1951 defence agreement with Denmark.
In public, the administration has emphasised diplomacy while declining to rule out other measures. The White House press secretary said this week that “all options” are on the table, while describing diplomacy as the President’s first preference. In parallel, senior officials have argued that Greenland’s strategic position and mineral resources justify a larger American role.
Several pathways are being discussed in Washington and in Greenland itself. The most straightforward — a purchase — is politically implausible given Greenlandic self-government and Denmark’s repeated insistence that the island is not for sale. A second approach would be to deepen defence and economic ties without a change of sovereignty, building on existing US basing rights. A third, more complex route would rely on Greenland’s right to self-determination: encouraging an independence referendum, followed by negotiations with Denmark, and only then a separate political process that could align Greenland more closely with the United States.
Polling suggests these options collide with Greenlandic public opinion. A Verian survey conducted for Berlingske and Sermitsiaq in January 2025 found 85 per cent of respondents opposed Greenland leaving the Danish realm to become part of the United States. The same polling found 56 per cent would vote for independence if a referendum were held, illustrating a distinction between support for eventual statehood and opposition to American annexation.
The political landscape in Nuuk reflects that split. All major parties back independence in principle but differ on timing and on the economic risks of breaking with Denmark’s block grant. This week, Pele Broberg, leader of the opposition Naleraq party, called for direct talks with Washington without Denmark, arguing Greenland should be able to engage the United States on its own terms. Greenland’s foreign minister, Vivian Motzfeldt, countered that Denmark controls foreign affairs and defence, making unilateral negotiations illegal.
In Copenhagen, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has treated the American rhetoric as a direct challenge to the alliance structure that has underpinned Danish security since 1949. She said a US takeover of Greenland would amount to “the end of NATO”, framing the issue as one ally threatening another’s territory. Denmark and Greenland have sought talks with Washington, insisting that any discussion must include Greenland’s elected government.
The wider European concern is that even a non-military campaign could destabilise institutions. Analysts have pointed to the potential for sustained pressure through investment promises, political engagement and information campaigns. Some commentaries draw comparisons with great-power influence operations elsewhere, arguing that a referendum process could become a vehicle for external leverage. There is, however, no public evidence that Washington has adopted such a strategy as policy, and US officials continue to describe their aim in terms of security and partnership.
A further idea circulating in commentary is a transactional bargain: European acceptance of a US role in Greenland in exchange for firmer American security guarantees for Ukraine. No government has publicly endorsed such a trade, and it would face immediate practical constraints. European and American leaders have repeatedly linked durable guarantees for Kyiv to a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement, while Russia has continued to prosecute the war. Against that backdrop, Danish officials have focused on reinforcing Arctic defence rather than entertaining territorial deals.
For Greenland itself, the central issue is control over its future. The island’s leadership has long argued that expanded US military activity in the Arctic can be compatible with Greenlandic interests if conducted transparently and with local consent. The current confrontation is whether Washington seeks that presence through alliance structures and agreements — or by reopening questions of sovereignty that Copenhagen, Nuuk and much of Europe regard as settled.
