Beijing is trying to shape the political framing of EU-China relations while Brussels searches for measurable progress on trade imbalance, overcapacity and strategic dependence.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has urged visiting members of the European Parliament to promote what Beijing calls a rational and objective perception of China and more positive EU policies, as trade tensions remain high between the two sides. China’s Foreign Ministry said Wang met a delegation from the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in Beijing on 21 July and called for an “upward dynamic balance” in trade. The ministry’s official account also said Wang addressed trade imbalance, Ukraine, human rights and artificial intelligence.
Wang told the delegation China and Europe are partners rather than rivals, while the EU is weighing tougher measures to address its goods deficit with China. The report noted that EU trade officials want results from trade talks by October.
The meeting matters because it placed lawmakers, not only Commission officials or national ministers, at the centre of Beijing’s message. The European Parliament has often taken a harder line on China over human rights, security, critical infrastructure and economic coercion. Wang’s appeal to legislators was therefore political as well as diplomatic.
EU Global recently analysed how EU-China trade pressure turns on rare earths, overcapacity and European unity. That remains the structural background. Brussels is not only complaining about a trade deficit. It is asking whether Chinese industrial capacity, subsidies and export controls can create strategic leverage over European manufacturing.
Beijing’s language of balance is carefully chosen. It avoids accepting European claims that the current trade relationship is distorted. Instead, it frames the issue as one to be managed over time through continued engagement. For Chinese diplomats, the objective is to prevent the EU from treating trade imbalance as a security problem requiring hard restrictions.
For Brussels, the problem is that imbalance has already become political. European manufacturers face pressure from Chinese electric vehicles, batteries, solar products, machinery, chemicals and consumer goods. At the same time, European companies depend on Chinese inputs in rare earths, magnets, electronics and clean-technology supply chains. That combination makes the relationship both indispensable and vulnerable.
The Parliament’s role is important. MEPs cannot negotiate trade deals directly, but they influence the political climate in which trade defence, human-rights resolutions, investment screening and regulatory measures are debated. If Beijing can persuade lawmakers that de-risking is becoming confrontation, it may weaken support for tougher EU measures.
The meeting also comes after a period of cautious re-engagement. Parliamentary visits to China resumed after years of strain, and both sides have an interest in preventing relations from sliding into managed hostility. But engagement does not remove the underlying disputes. Ukraine, forced labour concerns, market access, artificial intelligence governance and Chinese export controls all remain in the frame.
Wang’s remarks on the Ukraine crisis are especially sensitive. The EU continues to view China’s position on Russia’s war as a central test of trust. Beijing presents itself as a potential stabilising actor while maintaining close ties with Moscow. For many European lawmakers, that gap between diplomatic language and strategic behaviour remains unresolved.
Artificial intelligence adds another layer. Europe is trying to regulate AI while reducing dependence on foreign digital infrastructure. China wants dialogue but also seeks influence in standards, governance and global technology markets. When Wang includes AI alongside trade and human rights, he is signalling that Beijing sees EU-China relations as a broad political package, not a narrow tariff dispute.
The October timeline gives the diplomacy a measurable test. If trade talks produce limited or cosmetic outcomes, pressure will grow for tariffs, procurement restrictions, supply-chain rules or broader trade-defence measures. If Beijing offers concrete steps on market access, overcapacity or export reliability, Brussels may have more room to argue for engagement.
The core question is whether both sides can define balance in the same way. For China, balance may mean preserving market access while avoiding politicisation. For Europe, balance increasingly means reducing dependence, correcting distortions and ensuring that trade does not become coercive leverage. Those definitions are not yet aligned.
Wang’s meeting with MEPs therefore shows the next phase of the relationship. China is not only negotiating with the Commission; it is trying to shape European perceptions. The EU is not only seeking dialogue; it is preparing instruments in case dialogue fails. Between those positions sits the real test: whether political engagement can produce economic change before mistrust hardens into policy.
