As negotiations between Iran and the United States continue with no tangible results, a growing consensus is emerging among analysts that Tehran is deliberately using the talks as a delaying tactic, while Washington appears either unaware or unwilling to confront this possibility directly.
The premise, shared by several regional observers, is that Iran never genuinely intended to reach a compromise through the ongoing indirect negotiations. Instead, its objective is widely viewed as an effort to postpone or deter potential military action by the United States or Israel against its nuclear infrastructure.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has historically dismissed any dialogue with the West, and only reluctantly gave his approval to the current negotiations following significant military movements in the region. The US redeployment of carrier strike groups and long-range bombers to Diego Garcia, combined with airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, were interpreted in Tehran as precursors to possible strikes on Iranian territory. This apparent shift in the regional security environment prompted a tactical shift from Iran’s leadership.
At the same time, Iran’s regional position has weakened. The influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, once a key deterrent against Israeli action, has diminished. Israeli airstrikes have demonstrated the capability to project force over long distances, notably during operations against Houthi targets. Iran’s own defences were also shown to be vulnerable in recent Israeli actions.
The nuclear negotiations themselves remain narrowly focused. The discussions reportedly centre on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, currently estimated at over 300 kilograms of highly enriched material. Iran has indicated it may be willing to place this stockpile under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision or transfer it to a third party. However, the regime insists on retaining the right to enrich uranium up to the 3.67% threshold necessary for civilian use, and it demands to preserve the existing centrifuge infrastructure, even if mothballed.
Furthermore, Iran has introduced additional conditions: it seeks guarantees from the US Congress that, in the event of a future American withdrawal from any agreement, Iran would be entitled to financial or material compensation. Tehran also demands assurances that the European Union will not impose sanctions during the term of any agreement, despite the EU not being a party to the talks themselves.
In Washington, opinions are divided. Some within the administration, such as figures aligned with a more conciliatory approach, remain open to limited enrichment under strict conditions. Others, including hawkish legislators such as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, reject any scenario in which Iran retains domestic enrichment capabilities, citing the risk of breakout to weapons-grade enrichment levels.
As the deadline proposed by President Donald Trump approaches—reportedly sometime in May—there is scepticism over the likelihood of any agreement. The pattern seen in previous negotiations, including those under the Obama administration, suggests that Iran may use the deadline to request further discussions on minor issues, effectively extending the talks without meaningful progress.
Within Iran’s own political and military establishment, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), there are reportedly diverging views. Some elements are believed to recognise the risks posed by a potential US-Israeli military operation and might support a limited compromise. Nevertheless, total dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear programme—what some describe as a “Libyan model“—is viewed as a non-starter in Tehran, as it is seen as jeopardising regime survival.
Meanwhile, Iran’s regional alliances are under pressure. In Lebanon, public criticism of Hezbollah has intensified, and even the Iranian ambassador was summoned by the Lebanese foreign ministry in response to remarks opposing Hezbollah’s disarmament. Though Tehran later retracted the statement, Hezbollah itself remains adamant in refusing to disband. Some within Lebanon have begun discussing the possibility of normalising relations with Israel—once considered unthinkable.
In Syria, President Ahmed al-Sharaa has reportedly distanced himself from Iranian influence. Recent arrests of senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad figures—one of Tehran’s key proxies—by Syrian authorities indicate a potential strategic realignment. Al-Sharaa is said to be considering closer ties with the United States and may even be open to joining the Abraham Accords framework for regional normalisation.
These developments reflect a broader regional recalibration in the aftermath of the 7 October attacks and subsequent escalation in Israel’s north. In Jordan, there have been crackdowns on Muslim Brotherhood elements and Hamas supporters, further narrowing the operational space for Iran-aligned entities.
Despite these setbacks, Iran continues to support the Houthi movement in Yemen. Though airstrikes have had limited impact, maritime arms smuggling remains a persistent challenge. The Houthis’ ability to harass Red Sea shipping lanes and launch missile attacks towards Israel underscores their value to Iran as one of the few remaining operational proxies.
As the US-imposed negotiation deadline nears, the question remains whether Washington will choose to extend talks or declare them unsuccessful and shift to a more coercive strategy. Tehran, for its part, appears confident that it can outlast its interlocutors, either waiting for a more favourable administration in Washington or betting that international pressure will wane.
