Serbia has secured a further three-month extension of its gas supply agreement with Russia’s Gazprom, keeping Russian gas central to the country’s energy mix at a time when the European Union is trying to reduce Moscow’s remaining leverage over European energy markets.
The extension, announced by Serbian Energy Minister Dubravka Đedović Handanović after talks with Gazprom chairman Alexey Miller in Saint Petersburg, will keep supplies in place until the end of September. According to details published on 5 June, the minister said the arrangement was important for Serbia’s citizens and economy because it provided stable supplies, favourable pricing and flexibility in volumes.
The agreement is short-term, but politically important. Serbia is an EU candidate country and maintains close energy links with Russia. While the EU has sharply reduced its direct dependence on Russian gas since 2022, parts of south-eastern Europe and the Western Balkans remain more exposed because of geography, infrastructure and contract history.
Serbia receives most of its gas from Russia. The country has taken some steps to diversify, including supplies from Azerbaijan and access to liquefied natural gas through Greece-linked routes, but these alternatives have not yet displaced Gazprom as the dominant supplier. The latest extension therefore underlines the gap between formal diversification policy and practical energy dependence.
For Belgrade, the argument is economic and domestic. Secure gas supplies are politically sensitive because they affect household heating, industrial production and electricity generation. Serbian officials have repeatedly presented Russian gas as cheaper and more predictable than available alternatives, particularly during periods of market volatility.
For Brussels, the issue is different. The EU has spent years trying to cut the flow of energy revenue to Moscow after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Under its REPowerEU strategy, the bloc has sought to diversify gas supply, reduce consumption and accelerate renewable deployment. The Commission has also proposed a gradual phase-out of remaining Russian gas imports, with the aim of ending the bloc’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
Serbia is not an EU member and is not bound by all EU energy rules in the same way as member states. But as a candidate country, it is expected to align progressively with EU policy, including on energy security and sanctions-related measures. The European Commission’s 2025 Serbia report said Serbia should align with the EU’s policy of reducing gas dependence on Russia and address the issue of Russian majority control over parts of its gas and oil infrastructure.
That point is central. Serbia’s energy exposure is not limited to gas imports. Its oil company NIS, which operates the country’s only oil refinery, has long been linked to Russian ownership through Gazprom Neft and Gazprom. The company has become the subject of sanctions-related pressure from Washington, with talks under way over a possible acquisition by Hungary’s MOL. The overlap between gas contracts, refinery ownership and EU accession politics makes Serbia’s energy position particularly sensitive.
The new Gazprom extension also comes at a time when Russia is trying to preserve remaining energy ties with Europe. President Vladimir Putin used the St Petersburg International Economic Forum to signal that Moscow remained willing to resume supplies to Germany through the surviving line of Nord Stream 2 if Berlin agreed and if sanctions obstacles were removed. Serbia’s decision does not carry the same scale as a renewed German-Russian gas relationship, but it fits into the broader question of where Russian gas still retains influence in and around Europe.
For the EU, the Western Balkans are a test case for energy integration. Brussels has encouraged the region to diversify routes, strengthen interconnectors and join mechanisms that improve collective purchasing power. In October 2025, the EU invited Serbia to participate in collective gas-buying arrangements intended to reduce reliance on Russia. Yet the latest Gazprom extension shows that such measures will take time to change actual supply patterns.
The immediate impact of the three-month deal is stability for Serbia through the summer and into early autumn. But the short duration also points to uncertainty. Belgrade has not secured a long-term arrangement, and each extension keeps the same political question alive: whether Serbia can move towards EU energy alignment while continuing to depend heavily on Russian gas.
The issue has wider implications for EU enlargement policy. Brussels expects candidate countries to converge with EU foreign policy and energy-security objectives. Serbia’s balancing act — maintaining EU accession ambitions while preserving close economic and political ties with Moscow — has long complicated that process.
Energy dependence does not automatically determine foreign policy. But it limits room for manoeuvre. As long as Serbia relies on Gazprom for most of its gas needs, Moscow retains a practical channel of influence. For the EU, that makes Balkan energy diversification not only a market question, but also a strategic one.
The latest extension therefore should not be read as a routine contract adjustment. It is a reminder that Europe’s energy decoupling from Russia remains uneven, particularly outside the EU’s formal borders. Serbia’s short-term energy security has been preserved, but the longer-term political cost of continued Russian dependence remains unresolved.
