Vladimir Putin has held a video call with China’s leader, Xi Jinping, at a moment of renewed uncertainty for Russia’s energy exports in Asia and fresh claims from the White House that India has agreed to stop buying Russian oil.
The Kremlin said the two leaders spoke by videoconference on 4 February. Xi used the occasion to send Spring Festival greetings and said he was ready to “chart a new blueprint” for bilateral ties, according to China’s state news agency. Putin also exchanged greetings and spoke of further developing relations.
The timing has drawn attention because it followed public remarks by US President Donald Trump linking trade concessions for India to a pledge to halt Russian oil purchases. A White House statement said Washington would remove a separate 25 per cent tariff after India committed to stop buying Russian oil, and lower another tariff rate.
India has not publicly confirmed an outright cessation, but its foreign ministry has said India’s energy policy is driven by security of supply and diversification, while remaining open to new sources such as Venezuela if viable.
Market data and traders’ accounts suggest India’s intake has already been trending down. Reuters reported that India’s Russian oil imports fell in January, extending a decline that began in December, as refiners sought alternative barrels under sanctions pressure and amid US–India trade talks.
Russia has built much of its wartime export strategy around discounted sales of crude to Asia, with India and China the principal buyers. Any sustained reduction by New Delhi would raise the importance of China’s role as a customer, even as Beijing manages its own exposure to sanctions risk.
A Reuters report on 5 February said Russian sellers have widened discounts to Chinese buyers, seeking to shore up demand as India’s future purchases look less certain. It also said China’s state-owned refiners had suspended Russian purchases since October because of US sanctions, limiting how much additional crude China can absorb, while independent “teapot” refiners may not have enough capacity to take all displaced barrels.
Against that backdrop, the Putin–Xi call can be read as part of Russia’s effort to reinforce political alignment with its most consequential economic partner, while keeping energy trade moving despite constraints. China’s trade with Russia fell in 2025 compared with 2024, Reuters reported in January, indicating that the relationship is not insulated from wider pressures.
Some commentary around the call has argued that China is preparing to rely more on domestic hydrocarbons and could therefore reduce imports over time. China has been expanding its upstream ambitions, including shale gas. Industry reporting in 2025 described major deep shale gas discoveries by Sinopec in western and south-western China, part of a long-running push to lift domestic output.
However, claims that China is among the world’s largest consumers of US liquefied natural gas and will soon stop buying it are not supported by recent customs-based reporting. One industry compilation citing China Customs data said China imported only about 260,000 tonnes of US LNG in 2025 and recorded no imports after February, amid tariffs and trade frictions.
Even so, the direction of travel in China’s LNG demand has been softer than in recent years. Reuters reported that China’s total LNG imports fell in 2025, reflecting weaker Asian appetite that exporters are watching closely.
Beyond energy volumes, the call also sits within a wider set of questions about how Russia settles trade under sanctions. Russia’s financial watchdog told Putin last year that firms were using “netting, gold and cryptocurrency” to facilitate cross-border payments as payment problems eased, according to Reuters.
That does not confirm any specific mechanism for Moscow’s trade with Beijing, but it underlines the extent to which both sides have looked for alternatives to conventional channels, as sanctions and compliance risks have reshaped payment routes.
For India, the immediate issue is how far it can diversify away from Russian crude without disrupting domestic refining. Reporting in India has noted that some refineries are configured to process specific grades and that an abrupt switch can be operationally difficult, even if alternative suppliers are available.
In practical terms, this means New Delhi may continue to reduce exposure while avoiding a clean break, at least in the short term. Russia, for its part, appears to be lowering prices to defend market share in China and emphasising political coordination with Xi as uncertainty grows around India’s stance.
The Putin–Xi call, framed publicly in seasonal and diplomatic terms, therefore lands amid converging pressures: US efforts to squeeze Russia’s energy revenue, India’s recalibration of supply, and China’s balancing act between cheap discounted barrels and the risk of secondary sanctions.
