Washington’s new Pacific envoy has made access to Cook Islands seabed minerals a top priority, linking supply-chain security to a wider contest with China over influence, sovereignty and environmental risk.
The new US ambassador responsible for New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue and Samoa has identified Cook Islands seabed minerals as one of his highest priorities, making critical-resource access an explicit part of Washington’s Pacific strategy.
Ambassador Jared Novelly said the issue had moved rapidly up his agenda, while warning that China’s growing influence could create risks for small island states.
The Cook Islands’ exclusive economic zone contains large fields of polymetallic nodules believed to hold manganese, nickel, cobalt and other materials used in batteries, defence systems and advanced manufacturing. Commercial recovery remains technically, environmentally and politically contested.
Minerals and influence are converging
Washington wants supply chains less dependent on China, particularly for processed critical minerals. The Pacific seabed is attractive because it may contain resources at a scale capable of supporting future industrial demand.
The strategic competition is not limited to mining licences. Scientific partnerships, survey data, port access, financing and technical standards can shape which countries and companies gain long-term influence.
The Cook Islands has already developed cooperation with China on seabed research, while insisting that such arrangements do not automatically grant mining rights. The United States now wants to ensure it is not absent from the sector as commercial rules are formed.
EU Global recently reported how Western governments remain divided over the tools needed to counter Chinese mineral dominance. The Cook Islands shows that the competition is moving from pricing and processing into physical access to new resource frontiers.
Small-state agency matters
Language about great-power competition can erase the interests of Pacific governments. The Cook Islands is not simply an asset to be won by Washington or Beijing. It has its own political institutions, environmental responsibilities and economic development goals.
For a small island state, seabed resources could generate revenue and diversify an economy dependent on tourism. They could also create financial dependence, governance pressure and long-term ecological liabilities.
Agreements must therefore be judged on transparency, local consent, revenue distribution and the degree to which technical knowledge remains under national control.
New Zealand also has an interest because of its constitutional relationship with the Cook Islands and concern about regional security. Heavy-handed pressure from Wellington or Washington could strengthen the appeal of alternative Chinese partnerships.
The environmental unknown
Polymetallic nodules form over immense periods and support poorly understood deep-sea ecosystems. Mining would disturb the seabed, create sediment plumes and remove habitat that may not recover on human timescales.
Supporters argue that seabed extraction may avoid some land-mining impacts and supply metals needed for clean technology. Critics say the comparison is premature because ecological costs remain uncertain and monitoring at depth is difficult.
Strategic urgency can weaken environmental safeguards. If the US frames extraction principally as a race with China, Pacific governments may face pressure to accelerate before science and regulation are ready.
A test of the Western offer
Washington’s credibility will depend on what it offers beyond warnings about China. Pacific states want infrastructure, climate finance, education and sustained diplomatic attention, not episodic competition when a strategic resource is discovered.
A durable partnership would support independent geological research, transparent licensing and environmental capacity while allowing the Cook Islands to set the timetable.
Critical minerals are now central to defence and energy policy. The Cook Islands case shows that supply-chain security cannot be separated from sovereignty and trust.
If Washington approaches the seabed primarily as a source to secure before Beijing does, it may reproduce the extractive politics it claims to oppose. If it helps the Cook Islands make an informed and sovereign decision, the minerals could become a basis for partnership rather than rivalry alone.
