Russia has begun importing petrol from India after Ukrainian strikes on its refining network disrupted domestic supply. The unresolved question is whether Moscow is paying in hard currency, or using rupees and other non-dollar balances accumulated through its oil trade with Asia.
Russia has begun importing petrol from India by sea, marking a reversal for one of the world’s largest exporters of oil and refined products and pointing to the growing effect of Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s refining system.
According to industry sources, at least 60,000 metric tons of petrol have already been shipped from Indian refineries to Russia. Two tankers carrying parcels of 30,000 to 40,000 tons are reportedly en route, while Moscow is seeking to import up to 400,000 tons of petrol a month from several suppliers, including India and Belarus.
The move follows a series of Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s oil infrastructure, which have damaged refining capacity and contributed to petrol rationing, queues at filling stations and record price rises. Russia had already been preparing to import petrol by sea in June, an unusual step for a country normally associated with fuel exports rather than emergency purchases.
The timing is politically important. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said this week that Russia was in contact with foreign partners over possible imports of petroleum products at acceptable prices. The subsequent reporting on Indian shipments suggests that Moscow is not merely considering such purchases, but has already moved to secure seaborne supplies.
Before Ukraine intensified its attacks on Russian refineries, refined fuel exports were one of the revenue channels supporting Moscow’s wartime budget. Russia still exports large volumes of crude oil, including to India, but disruption to domestic refining changes the balance. If Russia must buy back finished fuel from foreign suppliers, the financial cost of the war moves from lost infrastructure alone to the wider question of foreign-exchange spending.
That question is not yet answered by the shipment data. The central issue is the currency of payment. If Russia is buying Indian petrol in dollars, euros, dirhams or other hard currency, the imports would add pressure to its limited liquid reserves. If the transaction is settled in rupees accumulated from previous oil sales to India, the cost to Moscow’s hard-currency position may be lower.
This distinction matters because the Russia-India oil trade has long carried a currency problem. In 2023, India and Russia suspended efforts to settle bilateral trade in rupees after Moscow became reluctant to accumulate more of a currency it could not easily use outside India. The current petrol shipments therefore raise a practical question: is Russia now spending hard currency on Indian fuel, or using funds already trapped in the Indian system?
India’s role has changed sharply since 2022. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian crude was a relatively minor part of India’s import mix. Western sanctions and discounts on Russian oil then turned India into one of Moscow’s major crude customers. Indian refiners processed that crude into petroleum products, some of which were sold into international markets. The new development is that refined fuel from Indian plants is now moving in the opposite direction, back to Russia.
The reported volumes are not large compared with Russia’s total fuel market. But they are important because they show that damage to Russia’s refining system has crossed from a domestic logistics problem into an external supply requirement. Moscow is also relying more heavily on Belarus, which has already increased petrol deliveries to Russia, while Russia’s parliament has approved tax changes designed to address shortages, including mechanisms linked to imported fuel costs.
The domestic pressure is visible at the pump. Recent reporting from Russia’s fuel market showed that shortages had pushed some independent petrol stations above 100 roubles per litre for the first time, while state-linked suppliers were trying to hold prices down through informal arrangements with regulators. In several regions, supply delays and rationing have become part of the wider economic effect of refinery disruption.
Russia’s broader fiscal position makes the payment mechanism more than a technical matter. Defence spending has expanded sharply, civilian sectors are slowing, and Moscow’s liquid fiscal buffers have been drawn down since 2022. If scarce hard currency must be used to import petrol, diesel and other refined products, Ukrainian attacks on refineries would have a compounding effect: they would reduce domestic supply, force expensive imports and divert financial resources away from other wartime needs.
If, however, Russia can use rupees from Indian oil sales, yuan from trade with China and roubles in dealings with Belarus, the pressure on its hard-currency reserves would be reduced. In that case, the operational damage to refineries would still be real, but the financial impact would be partly cushioned by alternative settlement mechanisms.
That is why the Indian petrol shipments are only the first part of the story. The physical movement of fuel confirms that Russia’s refining system is under strain. The financial route behind the cargoes will show whether that strain is temporary and manageable, or whether Ukrainian attacks are forcing Moscow to spend the reserves it needs to sustain military production and the wider costs of a prolonged war.
For Ukraine and its allies, the practical issue is therefore not only how many refineries are hit, or how many tons of petrol Russia imports. It is whether Moscow can replace damaged refining capacity through a closed trade loop with India, China and Belarus, or whether each imported cargo cuts into the financial resources available to continue the war into the next decade.
