China’s commerce minister Wang Wentao is due in Brussels on 29 June for talks with EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, in a meeting that will test whether the European Union can move beyond warnings about strategic dependence and turn them into enforceable policy.
The immediate agenda is trade, but the wider dispute is about leverage. The planned meeting follows renewed concern in Brussels over China’s expanding goods surplus with the EU, pressure on European manufacturers, and Beijing’s control over materials used in industrial, clean-technology and defence supply chains. According to the European Commission’s trade profile for China, the EU has long run a goods deficit with China, while recent reporting on the forthcoming Brussels meeting said that China’s goods trade surplus with the EU reached €360.6 billion in 2025 and continued to rise in early 2026.
The meeting comes after EU leaders called for stronger trade tools and a wider effort to reduce reliance on dominant suppliers. The Commission is preparing legislation intended to push companies to diversify sources of critical inputs. Although such measures are formally country-neutral, the political focus is clear. China remains the main concern.
Rare earths have become the clearest example. These materials are used in permanent magnets, electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronics, precision systems and defence-related technologies. The Commission states in its Critical Raw Materials Act overview that 100 per cent of the rare earths used for permanent magnets in the EU are refined in China. A separate Commission page on the Critical Raw Materials Act sets a 2030 target that no more than 65 per cent of the EU’s annual consumption of any strategic raw material should come from a single third country.
China’s export restrictions on rare earths have therefore had consequences beyond the United States. European companies have also faced uncertainty over licensing, supply delays and pricing risk. The European Parliament noted in its work on China’s rare-earth export restrictions that Beijing imposed controls in April 2025 on several rare earth elements and magnets used in the defence, energy and automotive sectors. For Brussels, this has turned a long-standing competitiveness issue into an economic-security problem.
The EU has tried to respond through the Critical Raw Materials Act, trade partnerships and industrial policy. These instruments aim to increase domestic extraction, processing and recycling, while widening supply from partner countries. The Commission’s raw materials diplomacy strategy is intended to build partnerships with non-EU suppliers, while recent efforts to court Brazil as a critical-minerals partner show how Brussels is trying to reduce exposure to Chinese supply chains.
Yet the gap between strategy and delivery remains considerable. Mining projects take years to permit. Processing capacity is capital-intensive. Recycling cannot yet meet demand. European firms still buy from established Chinese supply chains because they are cheaper, deeper and already integrated into global manufacturing.
This is why the proposed diversification law could become politically sensitive. If the Commission pushes companies to reduce dependence on single suppliers, business groups may ask who pays the cost. Alternative supply chains are rarely cheaper at the beginning. They also require certainty that public policy will remain stable long enough for companies to invest.
There is also a trade-policy risk. If Brussels presses too hard, Beijing may treat the measure as a hostile act, particularly if it affects sectors where China has built a dominant position. If Brussels moves too slowly, European industry may remain vulnerable to export controls, pricing shocks and political pressure.
The same tension runs through the EU’s wider China policy. Member states agree in general terms that excessive dependence should be reduced, but they do not all share the same level of exposure. Germany and several central European economies have strong manufacturing links with China. Southern European ports, logistics firms and infrastructure operators also have commercial interests tied to Chinese trade. Recent discussion among EU leaders on how to address the bloc’s trade imbalance with China showed the difficulty of turning shared concern into a common position.
The 29 June meeting will not resolve these structural issues. It is more likely to define the terms of the next phase. Šefčovič is expected to press for more predictable access to critical materials and less disruptive use of export controls. Wang is likely to defend China’s right to manage strategic resources while pushing back against EU measures that Beijing views as protectionist.
For Europe, the central question is whether dialogue can produce practical safeguards, or whether Brussels must rely increasingly on legislation, screening tools and industrial support. The answer will matter for more than EU-China trade. It will affect the resilience of clean technology, defence production, automotive manufacturing and the wider industrial base.
The EU has spent years describing de-risking as a middle course between dependence and decoupling. The Wang-Šefčovič meeting will show whether that formula can still work when the issue is not abstract geopolitical alignment, but access to the materials and components on which European industry depends.
