The United States has reported a delay in efforts to secure the release of more Belarusian political prisoners, according to exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, raising questions over the limits of Washington’s direct diplomacy with Alexander Lukashenko.
Tsikhanouskaya told Reuters that the Trump administration had informed Belarusian democratic forces that the next releases had been postponed. She said the delay did not mean the process had ended, but warned that any pause was damaging for detainees whose health is already affected by prison conditions.
The reported slowdown is significant because it is the first public indication that the prisoner-release track between Washington and Minsk has lost momentum after several months of visible results. Negotiations led by President Donald Trump’s envoy John Coale have helped secure the release of more than 400 prisoners. Human rights group Viasna says nearly 870 political prisoners remain in detention, including vulnerable detainees affected by age, illness or harsh conditions.
The US approach has represented a marked shift in Western policy towards Belarus. Since the mass repression that followed the disputed 2020 presidential election, Minsk has been under extensive sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Lukashenko’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the use of Belarusian territory by Russian forces, further reduced the scope for Western engagement.
The prisoner negotiations have therefore created a narrow channel of contact between Washington and Minsk. Earlier releases gave the Trump administration a tangible diplomatic result and offered the Belarusian regime a route to test whether concessions could bring sanctions relief or a partial normalisation of relations with the West.
That calculation now appears less straightforward. The United States has already eased some sanctions connected to Belarusian potash exports, but the practical benefits for Minsk have been limited. Reuters noted that European Union sanctions remain in place and export routes are constrained, reducing the commercial value of US measures. If Lukashenko expected Washington to deliver wider sanctions relief or influence Brussels, the results may have fallen short.
This matters because Belarusian potash is one of Minsk’s most important export sectors. Sanctions on potash, transport and financial channels have affected a major source of state revenue. If the regime concludes that prisoner releases bring only limited economic return, it may have less incentive to continue them at the same pace.
For the Belarusian opposition, the danger is that political prisoners become a bargaining instrument in a process controlled by Lukashenko. Tsikhanouskaya has previously warned Western governments against granting legitimacy to the Belarusian leader in exchange for partial releases. At the same time, she has acknowledged that US negotiations have achieved outcomes that other channels had not secured.
The dilemma is therefore practical and moral. Direct engagement can release detainees. It can also allow the regime to trade individuals for concessions while continuing repression against others. Reuters reported that Viasna has recorded at least 50 politically motivated prison sentences since December, including cases as recent as last month. That suggests the release process has not ended the machinery of political prosecution inside Belarus.
The issue also has wider strategic implications. Belarus remains closely aligned with Russia and is central to Moscow’s military posture on NATO’s eastern flank. Joint Russian-Belarusian military activity, including nuclear-related exercises, has kept Minsk inside the wider security confrontation between Russia and the West. Western policy towards Belarus therefore sits at the intersection of human rights, sanctions, Ukraine policy and deterrence.
The United States appears to have treated the prisoner track as a limited negotiation rather than a full reset. That distinction is important. A humanitarian deal can produce releases without recognising Lukashenko’s political legitimacy. But over time, repeated direct engagement may be presented by Minsk as evidence that Western isolation is weakening.
For the EU, the stalled release process presents a policy question of its own. Brussels has maintained sanctions over repression, forced migration tactics, support for Russia’s war and other actions by the Belarusian authorities. If Washington pursues selective relief while the EU maintains broader pressure, the transatlantic line on Belarus may become harder to coordinate.
That does not mean the EU and US necessarily disagree on the objective of securing prisoner releases. The difference lies in leverage. Washington may believe that targeted concessions can obtain immediate humanitarian results. Brussels may judge that sanctions should remain tied to structural change, including the end of repression, release of detainees and accountability for abuses.
The case also shows the weakness of sanctions when they are not matched by effective coordination. If the United States removes a restriction but the EU maintains a parallel measure, Minsk may claim that promised incentives are ineffective. If both sides ease pressure too quickly, Lukashenko may pocket concessions while continuing arrests. The balance is difficult, and the latest delay suggests that the regime is still trying to test it.
For detainees and their families, the distinction between sanctions strategy and diplomatic leverage is secondary. The immediate question is whether releases resume. Tsikhanouskaya’s statement that the process is not over will provide some reassurance, but the reported pause also underlines how dependent the prisoner track remains on political calculation in Minsk.
The Belarusian opposition has limited formal leverage. Its influence rests on international recognition, documentation of abuses and its ability to keep political prisoners visible in Western policy debates. If attention shifts elsewhere, the risk is that detainees become part of a slow negotiation rather than an urgent human-rights priority.
For Lukashenko, the pause may be a way to extract more from Washington or signal dissatisfaction with the economic return so far. For the Trump administration, it is a test of whether direct diplomacy can produce sustained results without undermining sanctions policy. For the EU, it is a reminder that Belarus remains a live strategic issue, not only a human-rights file.
The delay does not end the prisoner-release process. It does, however, expose its fragility. Belarus’s political prisoners remain caught between repression at home, sanctions diplomacy abroad and the unresolved question of how much leverage the West is prepared to use — or concede — to secure their freedom.
