Tehran’s warning over submarine internet cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz has raised concerns that a maritime corridor already central to global energy trade could also become a pressure point for data flows between Europe, Asia and the Gulf.
Iran has threatened to impose new controls on submarine internet cables running through the Strait of Hormuz, opening a fresh front in its attempt to use the Gulf’s geography as strategic leverage.
The warning, reported in regional and international coverage, centres on cables that carry internet traffic between Europe, Asia, the Middle East and parts of Africa. Tehran has indicated that it wants to charge technology companies and cable operators for the use of infrastructure passing through the area.
Iranian military spokesman Ebrahim Zolfaghari has been quoted as saying that Tehran will introduce fees for internet cables. Under the proposal, major technology companies such as Google, Microsoft, Meta and Amazon would be expected to comply with Iranian law, while cable owners could be required to pay licensing fees. Repair and maintenance rights would reportedly be reserved for Iranian companies.
The practical enforceability of such a scheme remains uncertain. US sanctions restrict payments to Iran by major American companies, and most international cable systems are not under Iranian ownership. It is also unclear how Tehran could compel compliance from companies whose infrastructure does not cross Iranian territorial waters.
The threat nevertheless carries weight because of the location. The Strait of Hormuz is best known as one of the world’s most important oil and gas chokepoints. It is also a key passage for digital infrastructure. According to submarine cable mapping and telecoms analysis, active cable systems crossing the area include AAE-1, FALCON and the Gulf Bridge International cable system.
Some operators have routed cables closer to Oman’s side of the strait to reduce exposure to Iran. However, industry analysis cited in recent reporting states that the FALCON and Gulf Bridge International systems still pass through Iranian territorial waters. That gives Tehran a narrow but potentially significant point of contact with infrastructure carrying large volumes of regional and intercontinental traffic.
A deliberate attack on such cables would not shut down the global internet. The network has redundancy, and traffic can often be rerouted. But damage in the Strait of Hormuz could still cause serious disruption, particularly if repairs were delayed by conflict, sanctions or access restrictions. The effect would be felt most sharply in the Gulf, where data centres, cloud platforms, logistics systems and financial services depend on stable international connectivity.
The risk extends beyond the region. India could be exposed to disruption if routes carrying traffic between South Asia, the Gulf and Europe were impaired. Its outsourcing, software and financial services sectors depend heavily on reliable cross-border data transmission. Delays or outages would have commercial consequences far beyond the immediate conflict zone.
Europe would also have reason to monitor the threat closely. Submarine cables carry financial transactions, corporate data, cloud traffic and government communications. Any disruption to routes between Europe and Asia could slow services, raise costs and expose the limitations of existing digital resilience planning.
The issue has gained further relevance because the Gulf has already become part of the wider regional infrastructure risk picture. In March, Amazon Web Services reported a fire at a UAE data centre after “objects” struck the site, according to Reuters reporting on the incident. The company did not attribute responsibility, but the incident underlined the vulnerability of cloud infrastructure in an increasingly militarised region.
The Red Sea offers another warning. In 2024, several underwater data cables were cut while Houthi attacks were disrupting shipping in the same corridor. The Houthis denied targeting the cables, but the episode showed how instability in maritime routes can affect digital infrastructure as well as commercial navigation. A simultaneous crisis affecting both the Red Sea and Hormuz would be more serious, forcing traffic onto alternative routes and increasing pressure on systems already carrying heavy loads.
Iran’s threat also fits a broader pattern of pressure around the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has recently sought to redefine its control over the area, with Iranian military figures describing a much wider operational zone than the narrow passage traditionally associated with the strait. Reuters has reported that Iran is attempting to frame the strait as part of a broader security perimeter.
For Tehran, the message is clear: energy routes, shipping lanes and data cables can all be used as instruments of leverage. For Europe, the lesson is equally clear. Digital infrastructure cannot be treated as an abstract network. It depends on physical cables, landing stations, repair vessels and access permissions, many of them located in politically unstable areas.
The immediate policy response is likely to focus on resilience rather than confrontation. European governments and companies will need to assess route diversification, cable protection, repair capacity and alternative data corridors. The aim would not be to eliminate exposure to the Gulf, which is unrealistic, but to ensure that no single chokepoint can create disproportionate economic disruption.
Iran may struggle to impose fees on the world’s largest technology companies. But by threatening the cables beneath Hormuz, it has highlighted a vulnerability that extends far beyond the Gulf. The modern internet is global in use, but local in its physical foundations. In contested waters, that distinction matters.
