The European Union’s latest financial and defence decisions mark a further stage in its support for Ukraine, while also raising questions about the security risks attached to deeper defence-industrial co-operation with a country at war.
On April 23rd, the EU formally approved a €90 billion loan for Ukraine, alongside its 20th sanctions package against Russia. The loan is intended to support Ukraine over the next two years, including both military needs and essential public services. The sanctions package targets Russia’s military-industrial base, energy sector, financial networks and sanctions-circumvention routes. The measures followed approval by EU ambassadors after earlier objections from Hungary and Slovakia were lifted.
This decision came shortly after the European Commission announced €1.07 billion in funding for 57 new projects under the European Defence Fund. The Commission said the selected projects cover artificial intelligence, cyber defence, drones and counter-drone systems, and are intended to support Europe’s wider defence readiness. Co-operation with Ukraine’s defence sector is increasingly part of this agenda, reflecting the operational experience Ukraine has gained since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
The strategic logic behind this policy is clear. Ukraine has become one of the world’s most active testing grounds for drone warfare, electronic warfare, battlefield adaptation and low-cost defence innovation. European governments and defence companies see practical value in learning from that experience. Ukraine, in turn, requires industrial scale, financing and access to European supply chains. The result is a closer relationship between Ukraine’s defence sector and parts of Europe’s own military-industrial base.
That relationship, however, is not without risk. Russia has framed European drone co-operation with Ukraine as evidence that EU and NATO states are moving closer to direct involvement in the war. Russia’s Defence Ministry has published details of companies it claims are involved in drone production or components for Ukraine, while Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said such facilities could be regarded as potential military targets. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stopped short of confirming any intention to strike European territory, but said the named countries were becoming more directly involved in the conflict.
European governments have treated these statements as politically significant. Germany condemned the publication of company details and described direct threats against firms as unacceptable. The episode illustrates a growing area of vulnerability: European industrial facilities that support Ukraine’s defence effort may become targets of Russian intimidation, cyber operations, sabotage attempts or other forms of pressure, even if direct military strikes on NATO territory would carry far greater escalation risks.
The issue is particularly acute in the field of drones. Ukrainian long-range drone operations have increasingly targeted Russian energy and military infrastructure, including oil facilities, airbases and ports. Russia, meanwhile, continues to use drones and missiles extensively against Ukrainian military infrastructure and cities. Recent reporting from Odesa, for example, described Russian drone strikes damaging residential and port infrastructure, while Ukraine responded with an attack on the port in Tuapse, which led to an oil spill on public beaches.
A relevant comparison can be drawn from the Middle East, although with important limits. During the recent Iran-related conflict, Iranian missiles and drones targeted US facilities in Gulf states, demonstrating that military infrastructure hosted by third countries can become vulnerable during wider escalation. That precedent does not translate directly to Europe: NATO territory, collective defence obligations and Russia’s own risk calculations create a different strategic environment. Even so, it shows that infrastructure linked to one side in a conflict can become exposed to pressure or attack when the opposing side chooses to widen the confrontation.
Domestic politics also forms part of the context. Several European leaders are pursuing expanded support for Ukraine at a time of weak public approval. Morning Consult’s April 2026 tracker placed German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron among the least popular elected leaders surveyed, while YouGov polling has recorded very poor net favourability for British Prime Minister Keir Starmer. These figures do not in themselves prove public opposition to Ukraine policy, as voters may disapprove of leaders for many unrelated reasons. But they do suggest that governments managing Ukraine policy, defence spending and sanctions are doing so in a politically fragile environment.
The policy challenge for Europe is therefore not whether Ukraine should be supported in principle, but how such support is structured, explained and protected. Defence-industrial co-operation may strengthen Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian aggression and may also improve Europe’s own military capabilities. At the same time, it increases the need for clear risk management, protection of critical infrastructure, cyber resilience, counter-sabotage measures and public communication about the costs and objectives of policy.
A more sustainable European approach would combine continued support for Ukraine with a realistic assessment of escalation risks. That means avoiding both complacency and alarmism. Russia’s warnings should not be accepted as a veto over European policy, but nor should they be dismissed as empty rhetoric.
The central question for EU governments is whether they can match their expanding defence commitments with credible security planning, democratic accountability and a clear explanation of how military support, sanctions and diplomacy fit into a longer-term strategy.
