Tehran’s reported offer to reopen the Strait of Hormuz while postponing talks on its nuclear and missile programmes places Moscow at the centre of the next phase of the crisis.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s arrival in St Petersburg for talks with Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov has placed Russia at the centre of renewed diplomacy over the Middle East crisis. The visit follows reports that Tehran has offered Washington a phased proposal: reopening the Strait of Hormuz and easing the immediate confrontation, while postponing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes.
The sequencing is significant. Tehran appears to be seeking relief from the economic and strategic pressure created by the confrontation with the United States and Israel, while avoiding immediate concessions on the core issues that Washington says must be resolved. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of global oil and gas shipments normally passes, has become the central bargaining point. According to the reported Iranian proposal, maritime access would be addressed first, while the nuclear file would be left for extended negotiations.
Araghchi’s consultations with Moscow suggest that Iran is not treating the issue as a bilateral matter with Washington alone. Russia has condemned the US and Israeli strikes on Iran and has presented itself as a potential intermediary. During the St Petersburg meeting, Putin pledged support for Iran and said Moscow wanted a swift resolution to the crisis.
For Tehran, Moscow offers diplomatic cover and a channel to coordinate positions with another permanent member of the UN Security Council. For Russia, the crisis offers leverage. Any prolonged disruption in the Gulf raises energy prices, increases pressure on Western economies, and strengthens the importance of alternative political and commercial alignments. China, as a major energy importer, is also an unavoidable actor in this calculation, even if Beijing remains less publicly visible in the current round of diplomacy.
President Donald Trump now faces a limited set of choices. He can reject Iran’s phased approach and insist that reopening Hormuz must be linked directly to verifiable limits on the nuclear and missile programmes. He can attempt to reopen the waterway by military means. Or he can accept a narrower deal, securing maritime passage while deferring the nuclear question. Each option carries risk.
A military attempt to force open the strait would be operationally complex, particularly if Iranian forces have continued mining activity during the ceasefire period. Even a partial threat to Gulf energy infrastructure would have consequences for oil prices, insurance costs and shipping routes. The risk for Washington is that an operation intended to restore deterrence could instead expose the limits of American power in a confined and heavily contested maritime space.
The diplomatic route is no less difficult. Iran’s internal decision-making has been complicated since the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the US-Israeli strikes of 28 February. The absence of a settled and undisputed centre of authority raises questions over who can approve a comprehensive settlement, particularly one involving the nuclear programme and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
That makes the Hormuz issue more tractable than the nuclear one. Orders affecting maritime passage can be implemented by military and security structures. A strategic decision to dismantle nuclear infrastructure or limit missile development would require a higher level of political authority and institutional consensus. Iran may therefore be offering the one concession it can deliver quickly, while postponing the one it is either unwilling or unable to make.
The comparison with Russia’s handling of negotiations over Ukraine is evident. Moscow has sustained diplomatic processes while continuing military pressure. Tehran may now be seeking a similar model: talks without final settlement, reduced immediate pressure, and time to rebuild strategic options. For Washington, the danger is that process substitutes for outcome.
If Trump accepts Iran’s terms, critics will argue that the United States has conceded the main point: reopening a global trade route in exchange for negotiations that may produce no enforceable nuclear settlement. If he rejects them, he risks a prolonged blockade, further economic disruption and renewed escalation. The result is a diplomatic trap in which neither firmness nor compromise guarantees success.
Araghchi’s visit to St Petersburg therefore matters beyond protocol. It indicates that Tehran is placing the next phase of the crisis within a wider alignment involving Russia, and potentially China. The question for Washington is whether it can prevent that alignment from shaping the terms of settlement. At present, the immediate issue is Hormuz. The larger issue is whether the United States can still impose a diplomatic sequence on adversaries that have learned to use delay, energy pressure and fragmented negotiations as instruments of power.
