Jamming satellites and phones: How Iran engineered a total internet shutdown

Date:

Mass demonstrations erupted across Iran in late December 2025 after a surge in fuel prices and mounting public anger over political repression. 

By early January the protests had spread to dozens of cities, prompting security forces to crack down violently.  On 8 January 2026, the government imposed a near‑total internet blackout, severing most fixed and mobile connections and even targeting satellite services.  Digital rights groups say the shutdown is the most comprehensive and sophisticated ever seen in Iran.

A complete shutdown

Researchers at Georgia Tech’s Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA) project have been monitoring the country’s connectivity since the Arab Spring.  In a detailed analysis, three IODA researchers wrote on The Conversation that their measurements show Iran has remained essentially offline since 8 January.  Connectivity signals they track — including routing announcements, active probing and background traffic — indicate only around 3% of normal network responsiveness, likely representing “whitelisted” government access.  The current blackout exceeds the 48½‑hour shutdown during the Israel‑Iran war in June 2025 and the seven‑day “Bloody November” blackout of 2019.

Previous shutdowns have been more selective.  During the Women, Life, Freedom protests in September 2022, authorities cut mobile networks at night but kept fixed‑line services active to limit economic disruption.  In June 2025, instead of blocking routing announcements, officials interfered with core internet protocols like Transport Layer Security and the Domain Name System, allowing some domestic services to function while isolating the country from the outside world.  The latest shutdown combines these techniques: routing announcements continue, but traffic appears blocked through interference with encryption protocols and selective whitelisting, meaning only a handful of sanctioned websites or users can access the global internet .

Measuring the impact

The Guardian described the blackout as a “new high‑water mark” for sophistication and severity.  Within hours of the shutdown, internet traffic from Iran fell by about 90%, international calls were largely blocked and mobile phone networks stopped functioning.  Digital rights experts told the newspaper that even Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite internet service, was being jammed.  Unlike previous outages, which left some communications channels open, this blackout appears to be fine‑tuned to allow government propaganda while cutting citizens off from the outside world.

Starlink receivers played a key role in keeping Iranians connected during the 2022 protests following the death of Mahsa Amini.  Tens of thousands of terminals are believed to be operating in Iran despite being illegal to possess.  But digital rights activists told the Times of Israel that since 8 January the government has begun jamming the system: users report packet loss of up to 80%, making the connection unreliable.  Experts suspect Iranian authorities are employing mobile jammers and interfering with GPS signals to degrade Starlink connectivity.  The International Telecommunication Union has previously called on Tehran to cease such interference, but the jamming has continued.

Despite the disruption, some Iranians continue to access Starlink.  A Reuters report cited users in western and border regions who said their terminals still worked, though service was patchy.  The monitoring group NetBlocks told the agency that non‑satellite connectivity had fallen to roughly 1% of normal levels.  Specialist Alp Toker added that the Starlink disruptions may involve jamming of terminal signals rather than system‑wide interference.

Protesters and the information war

The blackout has drastically limited the flow of news about the protests.  The demonstrators in Tehran and other cities are using Starlink to send videos and messages abroad, but the connection is constantly interrupted by jamming.  Protesters say security forces are using live ammunition and that thousands have been killed or arrested.  They accuse authorities of attempting to conceal the scale of the crackdown by cutting off communications.

In previous cycles of unrest, communications blackouts have allowed security forces to act with impunity.  Human rights groups say the 2019 shutdown enabled the regime to kill hundreds of protesters without leaving digital evidence.  The current blackout could similarly obscure abuses.  Protesters are calling on Western governments to intervene; some have called for satellite internet providers or foreign governments to restore connectivity.

Challenges to circumventing the blackout

Circumventing government‑ordered shutdowns is fraught with risk.  Starlink terminals require physical distribution and are considered contraband in Iran.  According to the IODA researchers, distributing enough terminals to make a difference is difficult and dangerous.  Even if terminals are obtained, the radio links they use can be detected by authorities, exposing users to surveillance.  Newer direct‑to‑cell satellite technology, which would allow ordinary mobile phones to connect to satellites, could mitigate hardware distribution challenges.  But like other radio communications, such connections would remain vulnerable to jamming.

Technology companies and governments face competing priorities when considering how to respond.  In 2022 Elon Musk shipped free Starlink terminals to Ukraine; similar support for Iran could invite diplomatic repercussions.  Reuters reported that U.S. President Donald Trump has said he will speak with Musk about restoring internet access, but no details have been announced.  Iran’s parliament formally banned Starlink in 2025, imposing severe penalties for possession.

Although the streets have now fallen quiet after a heavy-handed crackdown, experts say the regime’s digital blackout could persist. Iran’s new “whitelist” approach enables officials to keep core services and state messaging online while keeping most citizens offline. Combined with targeted jamming of satellite links and mobile networks, the policy signals a more enduring move towards precise and persistent censorship. With demonstrations suppressed, the challenge for those seeking change has shifted: maintaining even limited channels to document and communicate events is as critical as mass gatherings. Whether clandestine technologies or external support can pierce the shutdown will shape the next phase of Iran’s struggle.

EU Global Editorial Staff
EU Global Editorial Staff

The editorial team at EU Global works collaboratively to deliver accurate and insightful coverage across a broad spectrum of topics, reflecting diverse perspectives on European and global affairs. Drawing on expertise from various contributors, the team ensures a balanced approach to reporting, fostering an open platform for informed dialogue.While the content published may express a wide range of viewpoints from outside sources, the editorial staff is committed to maintaining high standards of objectivity and journalistic integrity.

Share post:

Popular

More like this
Related