Latest US labour data point to a clear loss of momentum. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that non-farm payrolls rose by 22,000 in August and the unemployment rate ticked up to 4.3%, the weakest monthly jobs gain since early spring.
Markets now expect the Federal Reserve to cut rates at its 17 September meeting. Some banks, citing the deteriorating labour picture, see scope for a half-point move.
The broader trend supports the slowdown thesis. A three-month average of job creation has slipped towards levels that no longer keep unemployment steady, with manufacturing shedding positions despite tariff protection.
Against this backdrop, a separate debate has intensified over the nature of US economic policy. In a widely read column for the Daily Mail on 5 September, Andrew Neil argued that the administration is practising a form of “state capitalism”, combining heavier government direction of private investment with frequent executive action and a tougher security posture. His piece sets out a comparative frame—drawing parallels with China’s party-led model—that has since been picked up across US and European commentary.
Several recent measures have fuelled that discussion. First, the federal government has taken a significant equity stake in Intel. The Associated Press reported that Washington converted previously issued funds and pledges into a 10% non-voting holding. Intel’s own statement describes the government’s position as passive, with no board seat or governance rights, alongside a conditional warrant linked to the firm’s foundry business. Supporters say the move anchors domestic chip capacity; critics warn of creeping politicisation of corporate strategy.
Second, Nvidia and AMD agreed to share 15% of their China-related chip revenues with the US Treasury in exchange for export licences. The deal—framed by backers as a way to recoup national-security costs—has been labelled by some analysts as an ad-hoc export tax implemented via executive bargaining rather than statute.
Third, Apple has lifted its domestic investment pledge to $600 billion over four years, launching an “American Manufacturing Program” to pull more of its supply chain onshore. While Apple casts the step as corporate strategy, the White House has highlighted it as evidence that pressure on multinationals is delivering visible re-shoring.
M&A policy has also shifted. The administration approved Nippon Steel’s acquisition of US Steel but attached an unusual national-security agreement, including a non-economic “golden share” conferring veto rights in defined areas and the authority to name a board member. The arrangement, rare in the US context, borrows from European practice and gives the executive a continuing say in selected corporate decisions.
There have been contested optics around major events and assets. The White House has announced plans to host the 2026 G20 leaders’ summit at the Trump National Doral resort in Florida—reviving an idea dropped during the previous term amid ethics concerns.
Separately, the Pentagon has accepted a luxury jet donated by Qatar for retrofit as Air Force One; reports indicate significant public outlays for conversion and questions over post-presidency disposition. Both episodes have prompted scrutiny from ethics lawyers and Congress.
For supporters, the emerging framework is a hard-nosed industrial strategy: tying market access and regulatory approvals to domestic production, while securing direct public upside in strategic firms. They argue that, in a world of subsidy races and technology controls, a more transactional state is necessary to protect critical supply chains and accelerate re-industrialisation.
For detractors, the same toolkit blurs the line between industrial policy and political control, risks deterring private investment, and adds volatility to an already slowing economy. The Intel shareholding and the chip-export revenue-share, they say, set precedents that future administrations might deploy more widely.
The macro picture will determine how far this experiment can run. If the labour market weakens further and the Fed eases policy, earnings and investment plans may be revised across sectors regardless of executive deals. Conversely, if rate cuts stabilise demand, the administration’s interventions could claim credit for any manufacturing uptick—even if causation is contested. Either way, Europe will watch closely. A more directive US state complicates transatlantic coordination on subsidies, export controls and competition rules, and will shape how EU firms weigh US expansion against the bloc’s own industrial measures.
For now, the facts are these: growth is slowing; the state’s footprint in corporate decisions is larger than a year ago; and the mix of security policy and economic management is tightening. The next key data point is the Fed’s September decision—and whether incoming inflation numbers give policymakers room to prioritise employment over price pressures.
OPEC+ set to extend output increases from October, but at a slower pace
