Donald Trump said on Friday that the United States had “lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China,” a remark posted with a photograph of Narendra Modi, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping together.
The comment follows a week of high-profile diplomacy in China and comes amid US tariff measures that have soured relations with New Delhi.
The immediate backdrop is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, where Mr Modi made his first visit to China in seven years and met Mr Xi and Mr Putin. Imagery from the summit underscored closer public engagement among the three leaders and added pressure on Washington’s long-running bid to deepen strategic ties with India.
US–Russia relations have been strained since Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, condemned in a United Nations General Assembly resolution and by the EU. That rupture, compounded by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, limited prospects for substantive co-operation well before Mr Trump’s current term.
Mr Trump’s post also lands as his administration’s tariff policy bites India. Industries there warn that newly imposed duties—reported at up to 50 per cent on a large share of Indian exports to the US—risk job losses and eroding competitiveness in sectors such as textiles, footwear and seafood. New Delhi has been seeking mitigation and alternative markets.
By contrast, tariffs on China have been in flux. After sharp hikes earlier in the year, Washington and Beijing agreed temporary easing to a 10 per cent “truce” rate for set periods, even as a universal baseline tariff on all imports remains in force. The tariff picture thus differs between India and China in both rate and trajectory.
Energy trade continues to shape India’s posture. Indian refiners have bought substantial volumes of discounted Russian crude since 2022 and officials signalled today that purchases will continue despite US tariffs and political pressure. The savings have been material for Indian buyers, reinforcing New Delhi’s emphasis on strategic autonomy in energy security.
Russia’s growing dependence on China is also relevant. Reporting and official statements in 2025 point to Chinese firms supplying machine tools, chemicals and other components that are useful to Russia’s defence production, even as Beijing denies providing lethal aid. This industrial link deepens Moscow’s economic and technological reliance on China.
In South Asia, recent political shifts have complicated India’s regional influence. The Maldives elected Mohamed Muizzu in 2023 on an “India Out” platform, while Bangladesh experienced a student-led uprising in 2024 that toppled the long-standing government of Sheikh Hasina. Sri Lanka’s 2024 presidential election produced a change of leadership and policy recalibration in Colombo.
Taken together, these dynamics help explain why images from Tianjin were potent. They showed India engaging in a forum where China sets the stage and Russia seeks partners to cushion sanctions pressure, even as New Delhi maintains security ties with the US and participation in groupings such as the Quad. The summiteering does not amount to a formal alignment, but it complicates US assumptions about India’s near-term choices.
For Washington, the policy question is whether trade coercion accelerates outcomes it seeks to avoid. Higher duties have clearly strained economic ties with India; US policy towards China now oscillates between pressure and limited tactical de-escalation; and Russia remains anchored to Beijing for markets and inputs.
SCO summit opens in Tianjin as Xi hosts Putin and Modi amid US–India tariff dispute
