The Trump administration has developed a set of military options aimed at removing Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, ranging from stand-off airstrikes to a special-forces raid to capture or kill the Venezuelan leader, according to multiple U.S. officials cited by The New York Times.
While no final decision has been taken, senior aides are reported to favour a coercive approach and the Justice Department is said to be examining legal pathways to proceed without a fresh authorisation from Congress.
The reported menu of options comprises three broad courses. The first envisages precision strikes against Venezuelan military sites and loyalist units to expose Mr Maduro to regime fracture or flight. A second, higher-risk variant would commit elite U.S. units—such as Delta Force or SEAL Team Six—to a decapitation or snatch mission. A third, most complex plan would see U.S. special operations seize airfields, oil facilities and other critical nodes to degrade the regime’s control. Analysts note that the latter two would carry materially greater risks to both U.S. personnel and civilians.
These deliberations are set against an ongoing U.S. military build-up in the southern Caribbean that began in late August and has expanded in recent days. The Navy’s USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group is redeploying from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean, joining a presence that already includes multiple surface combatants, a special operations vessel and a fast-attack submarine. Open-source fleet tracking and defence officials indicate that close to a fifth of deployed U.S. warships are being concentrated in the wider region.
Publicly, President Donald Trump has framed recent maritime and aerial actions as counternarcotics, with U.S. forces having carried out more than a dozen strikes on suspected drug-running vessels since September. However, the scale and composition of forces massing near Venezuela have prompted external assessments that Washington is preparing for broader contingencies. The build-up includes eight Navy warships and more than 4,000 personnel, and that further assets are expected upon the Ford’s arrival.
A legal component is also taking shape. Officials have previously pointed to the long-standing U.S. narco-terrorism indictment of Mr Maduro and senior figures (unsealed in 2020) and to the administration’s 2025 sanctions actions targeting the so-called Cartel de los Soles, a network U.S. agencies link to elements of the Venezuelan state. Treasury in July alleged the cartel’s facilitation of narco-terrorism and named Mr Maduro’s regime in connection with it. Commentators close to the matter suggest the Justice Department could argue that classifying Mr Maduro and top officials as leaders of a terrorist-designated cartel would place them within the scope of lawful military targeting despite prohibitions on assassinating foreign heads of state.
Personnel dynamics in Washington may influence the internal debate. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been a prominent advocate of a harder line on Caracas. Senior White House aide Stephen Miller is also pressing for decisive measures. The administration has not confirmed the specific options under consideration.
Energy considerations remain central. Mr Trump has repeatedly queried advisers on the potential benefits for U.S. energy security, given Venezuela’s very large proven reserves. In parallel with coercive steps, economic levers have been adjusted. Earlier this year Washington narrowed permissions for U.S. companies in Venezuela after allowing broader activity in 2023–24; by late July, Chevron had been granted a restricted licence to maintain stakes but not to transfer oil proceeds to the Maduro government. In late July Mr Maduro said, “Chevron has been in Venezuela for 102 years, and I want it to stay for another 100 years.”
Diplomatic off-ramps have been tested but have not yielded agreement. Associated Press reported in mid-October that Caracas floated a phased transition proposal in which Mr Maduro would step down in three years, with vice-president Delcy Rodríguez completing the term; the White House rejected the idea and questioned Mr Maduro’s legitimacy. Separately, reports have suggested that Caracas offered wide-ranging oil and mining concessions—including preferential terms for U.S. firms and a reorientation of exports away from China—in a bid to avert confrontation; Washington has not confirmed any such offer.
Regional and legal risks are being flagged internationally. Satellite imagery and official releases have shown U.S. amphibious units conducting live-fire drills near Venezuela, which Caracas portrays as an invasion threat. The UN human rights office and legal scholars have warned that lethal strikes on suspected traffickers absent imminence or due process risk violating international law. Administration officials, for their part, maintain that the operations to date are consistent with U.S. and international authorities related to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism.
