The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) has issued a wide-ranging statement accusing Moldova’s leadership of attempting to transform the country into a military platform for NATO aggression against Russia.
The claims were made despite the fact that Moldova and Russia share no common border — a geographical detail that undermines the central thrust of the allegations.
The statement, which bears the hallmarks of Cold War-era rhetoric, accuses Moldovan President Maia Sandu personally of facilitating Western military infrastructure under the guise of civil development projects. Among the SVR’s chief concerns is the construction of European-gauge railway lines within Moldova, which Russian intelligence characterises as preparatory groundwork for NATO military operations.
In reality, Moldova’s decision to introduce European-gauge tracks reflects a broader regional strategy. The country borders Romania, an EU and NATO member with standard European railway infrastructure, and Ukraine, which is currently expanding its own European-gauge network to improve trade and humanitarian corridors amid ongoing war. Critics note that SVR’s suggestion — that Moldova’s transport policy is part of a war plan — fails to acknowledge the practical economic and logistical imperatives driving infrastructure upgrades.
The statement further accuses the Moldovan government of upgrading its airports for the alleged purpose of accommodating NATO military aircraft. This interpretation has been widely rejected in Chişinău, where officials argue that modernisation efforts are aimed at improving civil aviation standards and regional connectivity.
Observers suggest that Moscow’s recent assertions are part of a broader political campaign aimed at influencing Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Kremlin-linked media have intensified efforts to discredit Sandu and her pro-European administration, particularly following her re-election to the presidency, in which she defeated a pro-Russian candidate.
The SVR’s allegations coincide with renewed accusations that Moldovan military personnel are covertly participating in the war in Ukraine. These claims have been officially denied by Moldova’s Ministry of Defence, which reiterated on Monday that the country remains committed to its constitutional neutrality.
Moldova’s neutral status has been enshrined in its foreign policy since independence, though this has not prevented interference from Moscow in the form of political pressure, disinformation campaigns, and the continued presence of Russian forces in the breakaway region of Transnistria.
With elections approaching, the Russian narrative appears to align with efforts to boost political actors favourable to Moscow. Among the key figures is Ilan Shor, a fugitive businessman based in Russia, who has faced corruption charges in Moldova. According to Moldovan authorities, Shor is actively engaged in funding and organising political movements designed to compete in the parliamentary elections — or serve as proxies for a pro-Russian left-wing coalition should they be barred from the ballot.
Former President Igor Dodon, a long-standing Kremlin ally, has also re-emerged on the political stage. Last week, Dodon travelled to Minsk for a widely publicised meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Belarusian state media covered the encounter extensively, during which Lukashenko reportedly cautioned Dodon against aligning too closely with Western powers, warning that the West would abandon Moldova’s interests. Lukashenko presented Russia as the only reliable guarantor for post-Soviet states.
Analysts view this engagement as indicative of Russia’s preferred model for Moldova — closer alignment with authoritarian-led regimes such as Belarus, rather than further integration with the European Union. Belarus under Lukashenko has served as a key staging ground for Russian operations against Ukraine since 2022, and is currently under heavy Western sanctions for its role in facilitating the invasion.
Critics of the Russian position argue that while the Kremlin accuses Sandu’s government of militarising Moldova, it is in fact Moscow and its allies who are actively seeking to instrumentalise Moldovan territory in support of their geopolitical ambitions. The ongoing Russian presence in Transnistria — a region internationally recognised as part of Moldova — remains one of the most visible symbols of this policy.
The timing of the SVR’s statement has led many to interpret it as an attempt to shape the domestic narrative in Moldova ahead of parliamentary elections, discredit the incumbent leadership, and lend legitimacy to pro-Russian opposition groups. Moscow’s aim, analysts suggest, is not merely rhetorical but strategic: to install a government more receptive to Kremlin interests, particularly at a time when Moldova’s Western-oriented trajectory appears to be consolidating.
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