US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement that Washington has “almost exhausted” its sanctions options against Russia has intensified debate in Kyiv and European capitals about the future of Western strategy in the war in Ukraine.
Speaking after a meeting of G7 foreign ministers, Rubio said the United States had already imposed restrictions on Russia’s largest oil companies, including Rosneft and Lukoil, and that further steps would focus mainly on enforcing existing measures rather than devising new ones.
Recent US sanctions have brought Lukoil directly into the spotlight. The company now faces significant disruption to its international operations, and Washington has blocked attempts to shift its foreign assets to new owners ahead of a November enforcement deadline.
Rubio also highlighted Russia’s use of a so-called “shadow fleet” of tankers and other opaque arrangements to bypass oil restrictions, arguing that more rigorous monitoring of these schemes is now more important than adding new names to sanctions lists. He called on European states in particular to play a more active role in tackling these evasion networks.
For Kyiv and a number of European governments, the focus on enforcement reflects a long-standing concern that Russia has managed to avoid a substantial part of energy-related pressure through reflagged ships, complex trading chains and off-market deals. Analysts argue that the “shadow fleet” continues to generate significant revenue for Moscow despite successive rounds of Western measures.
Rubio’s comments are also being interpreted as a political signal. By emphasising that Washington is “running out of” new targets, he appeared to indicate a reluctance by the Trump administration to escalate economic pressure further, even though possible additional measures remain in the US toolkit. For Moscow, this may suggest that the US is seeking to frame conditions for potential negotiations rather than for a new sanctions wave.
At the same time, Rubio underlined that European partners still have “some potential for further action”, especially against the shadow fleet. This has been read in Kyiv as a reminder that the European Union’s own sanctions regime, and its enforcement, will be critical to the overall effectiveness of Western economic pressure.
The question of frozen Russian sovereign assets held in the EU is central to that debate. Around €210 billion is immobilised in Europe, most of it at Euroclear in Belgium, but member states remain divided over outright confiscation and long-term legal risk.
Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has publicly urged caution, arguing that seizing the principal could damage financial stability and the euro’s role as a reserve currency. For now, Brussels is leaning towards using only the windfall income generated by these assets to support Ukraine, rather than the assets themselves.
A parallel discussion concerns whether Norway should help guarantee a large EU loan to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian reserves. Finance Minister Jens Stoltenberg has made clear that Oslo will not use its sovereign wealth fund as the sole guarantor for such a scheme, even though Norway remains open to contributing under a broader European framework.
In this context, Rubio’s assertion that US sanctions options are close to exhausted can also be seen as pressure on EU capitals to develop their own financial instruments, whether by expanding the use of windfall profits on frozen assets or by constructing new borrowing mechanisms at EU level. The outcome of these debates will shape Ukraine’s medium-term financing prospects.
The strategic question remains whether sanctions and diplomatic pressure can alter the Kremlin’s calculus. Rubio stated that Russia has “clearly shown” that it wants to seize the remaining parts of Donetsk region still under Ukrainian control, and he stressed that such conditions are unacceptable for Kyiv.
Ukrainian officials fear that presenting this as the main obstacle to a ceasefire could shift perceived responsibility for the continuation of the war onto Ukraine if it refuses territorial concessions. They argue that any arrangement based on accepting the loss of further territory would risk creating only a temporary pause in fighting rather than a durable peace.
Domestic politics in the United States add an additional layer. President Donald Trump has repeatedly linked his foreign-policy efforts to his ambition to secure a Nobel Peace Prize, and has campaigned openly on that theme. Commentators note that a visible move towards a ceasefire in Ukraine before the Nobel shortlist for 2026 is finalised would be politically advantageous for the White House.
Critics in Kyiv warn that short-term political incentives in Washington could lead to pressure for a settlement that freezes, rather than resolves, the conflict, while leaving large parts of Ukrainian territory under occupation. They also point to what they see as mixed messaging from US officials: statements from the Treasury about the possibility of further pressure sit alongside Rubio’s assessment that there are few genuinely new sanctions options left.
For the Kremlin, such signals may reinforce the view that Western unity on sanctions and war aims is under strain. For Ukraine, they highlight the importance of continued alignment between US and EU policy: on enforcement of existing measures, on the handling of frozen Russian assets, and on the terms under which any eventual negotiation with Moscow might be pursued.
