India has deployed a 65-strong contingent to Russia’s Mulino training ground for the multilateral military exercise “Zapad-2025”, marking New Delhi’s first participation in the Russian–Belarusian war games and signalling continued defence ties with Moscow amid heightened trade tensions with the United States.
The Indian Ministry of Defence said the team—primarily from the Army’s Kumaon Regiment, with Air Force and Navy representation—departed on 9 September for the drills scheduled from 10 to 16 September near Nizhny Novgorod.
The troops are based at the Mulino range, about 65 kilometres west of Nizhny Novgorod. Indian officials have framed the deployment as routine military diplomacy, intended to “strengthen defence co-operation” and foster interoperability through joint tactical training with Russian forces. Russian and Belarusian formations form the core of the exercise, which is one in a cycle of large manoeuvres regularly conducted by the Union State.
India’s participation comes days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, on 31 August–1 September—a first trip to China by Mr Modi in seven years. The summit featured bilateral engagements with both President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin, part of a wider effort by Beijing and New Delhi to stabilise relations while managing unresolved border frictions.
Diplomatic signalling around the Tianjin summit suggested a modest thaw between China and India, with both sides seeking to compartmentalise security disputes and resume certain channels of co-operation. Analysts noted that the optics of Mr Modi’s visit—alongside meetings on the summit sidelines—were calibrated to keep India’s strategic autonomy intact while preserving options with multiple partners.
The timing of the Zapad deployment also intersects with a sharp turn in U.S.–India trade relations. In late August, the United States announced new tariffs—reported by major outlets as “up to 50%” on some Indian imports—citing India’s continued purchases of Russian crude as a key irritant. Washington has simultaneously urged European partners to consider coordinated measures on trade with China and India to curb Russia’s oil revenue. New Delhi, which has significantly increased imports of discounted Russian oil since 2022, has argued that such purchases serve domestic energy security and do not breach international law.
The tariff decision has become a focal point in regional diplomacy. At Tianjin, Mr Modi’s meetings with Chinese officials were interpreted by observers as part of India’s hedging strategy, keeping lines open with Beijing even as it remains active in groupings with the United States, Japan and Australia. Meanwhile, Kyiv has urged faster and broader Western measures to pressure Moscow, in comments that referenced the debate over tariffs on third countries’ trade with Russia.
For Moscow, India’s presence at Mulino offers a public reminder of long-standing defence links, including training exchanges and legacy equipment support. While India has diversified arms procurement over the past decade, Russian platforms remain embedded in the force structure, and joint exercises—whether bilateral or multilateral—continue to feature in the relationship. The Zapad-series drills, historically oriented toward Russia’s western theatre, provide an opportunity for Indian units to observe Russian command-and-control methods and combined-arms integration in a large-scale scenario.
For New Delhi, the calculus is broader than a single exercise. Participation maintains access and familiarity with Russian systems, signals policy independence, and serves as a counterweight in a fluid geopolitical environment. Officials have stressed that engagement with Moscow does not preclude deepening ties with the United States and Europe, where India has expanded defence industrial co-operation and operational exercises in recent years. However, the immediate backdrop of new U.S. tariffs has complicated messaging, prompting closer scrutiny of India’s choices across multiple capitals.
The SCO dimension remains salient. The Tianjin summit allowed India to advance agendas on counter-terrorism, connectivity and economic co-operation within a Eurasian framework that includes China, Russia and Central Asian states. Any sustained improvement in India–China dialogue would likely be incremental and contingent on managing border incidents and military postures along the Line of Actual Control. Nonetheless, the summit underscored that both sides see value in stabilising ties at a time of shifting trade patterns and contested supply chains.
As Zapad-2025 concludes, the near-term markers to watch include whether Washington refines its tariff approach following consultations with partners, whether Moscow and New Delhi schedule high-level bilateral visits before year-end, and how India balances defence engagement with Russia against parallel commitments in the Indo-Pacific. Each will inform whether the Mulino deployment is read as a one-off tactical choice or part of a more durable alignment trend.
