At the EU–China summit held in Beijing, European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called on Chinese President Xi Jinping to exert influence over Russia to halt its war against Ukraine and engage in negotiations.
Von der Leyen stressed that China holds sway over Russia, just as the European Union maintains leverage over Ukraine, suggesting that a coordinated approach between Beijing and Brussels could help bring an end to the conflict.
However, a central question remains unanswered: does President Xi have any interest in supporting such an initiative?
In the lead-up to the summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, a close ally of Xi Jinping, reportedly informed European officials that China would not allow Russia to be defeated in its war against Ukraine. This statement, delivered in the context of growing strategic competition with the United States, signals that Beijing’s interest in Russia’s military performance may be intensifying.
In recent months, the intensification of the Sino-American trade dispute appears to have influenced China’s posture. Xi Jinping is said to be keen to demonstrate to US President Donald Trump that China retains strategic levers—one of them being its alignment with Moscow. The broader calculus in Beijing increasingly treats Russia’s position in the war as a factor in China’s global strategic balance with Washington.
European leaders have attempted to maintain a joint position with the United States regarding China. However, divergences in economic interests between Washington and EU capitals are now complicating the formulation of a coherent transatlantic policy. While the EU has sought to engage China on trade and access to critical materials, the US administration is pressing ahead with tariff policies that also target European products. This has created a situation where Brussels may find itself simultaneously facing trade pressure from Washington and calls to impose new sanctions on China—a course of action that would likely have significant economic consequences.
Trump’s renewed threats of tariffs on EU goods raise questions about the practical viability of coordinated sanctions against Beijing. European economies already strained by internal fiscal pressures may not be in a position to sustain further disruptions to their trade with China, particularly given the EU’s reliance on Chinese rare earths and the desire among European firms to regain fuller access to the Chinese market.
During the summit, Xi Jinping reportedly told his European counterparts that China is not responsible for Europe’s current economic problems, pointing instead to the US-led tariff regime. This remark underscores a broader Chinese effort to separate its bilateral relations with the EU from its tensions with Washington, effectively using the EU–US divergence to maintain space for manoeuvre.
Although the United States has floated proposals to introduce punitive tariffs against countries that continue to purchase Russian oil—a measure that would directly target China—there is limited clarity on whether such initiatives are politically or economically sustainable. Trump’s administration has previously backed down from tariff escalations under pressure, and it is uncertain whether Beijing would respond differently this time.
Within this shifting landscape, the European Union faces a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, Brussels wants to increase pressure on Russia to end its war in Ukraine, and recognises that Chinese restraint—or support—could be a decisive factor. On the other hand, the EU’s economic relationship with China remains a priority, and there is limited appetite in many European capitals for broad-based trade retaliation that could damage already fragile economies.
Chinese support for Russia has remained largely political and economic, including the continued importation of Russian energy products, which provides the Kremlin with critical revenue. While Beijing has stopped short of supplying direct military assistance, the broader strategic alignment between the two countries is clear.
At the same time, EU officials in Beijing have continued to raise issues such as the export of critical raw materials, the return of European firms to the Chinese market, and trade facilitation measures. These topics dominated the formal agenda, suggesting that while the war in Ukraine remains a prominent political concern, economic interests continue to drive the EU–China relationship.
Ultimately, the question of whether the EU and US can apply effective joint pressure on China hinges on their ability to align their policies and priorities. The failure of past sanctions regimes to alter Russian behaviour, including the broad sanctions imposed in 2022, has exposed the limitations of Western leverage over states that enjoy strategic backing from global south powers.
In the absence of a unified transatlantic approach, Xi Jinping appears to retain room for manoeuvre between Washington and Brussels. This dynamic has allowed China to pursue its strategic interests—supporting Russia where useful, while avoiding direct confrontation with Europe or the US.
The broader lesson for European policymakers may be that effective pressure on China requires not only coordinated diplomacy but also clearly defined economic instruments—a toolkit that remains underdeveloped. For now, EU leaders are left to rely on appeals and symbolic statements, with few concrete levers available to shift Beijing’s position on the war in Ukraine.
