China used a four-day sequence of diplomacy and pageantry to project convening power and military modernisation, hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leaders’ summit in Tianjin before staging an 80th-anniversary Victory Day parade in Beijing.
The choreography brought together presidents and prime ministers from across Eurasia and the “Global South”, with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un featuring prominently alongside Xi Jinping.
At Tianjin on 31 August–1 September, SCO heads of state including China’s Xi, Russia’s Putin and India’s Narendra Modi met amid a dense programme of bilaterals. While detailed deliverables were limited, the optics underscored China’s ability to assemble a large non-Western grouping on its own soil. Modi then declined to attend the subsequent parade in Beijing, reflecting New Delhi’s careful positioning between major powers.
The 3 September parade in Tiananmen Square showcased new weaponry and, notably, a full display of China’s land-, sea- and air-based nuclear forces — a first in such concentrated form according to multiple outlets — signalling advances in strategic deterrence. Putin and Kim stood with Xi through the proceedings, underlining a growing public alignment among the three nuclear-armed states.
Beyond symbolism, Beijing provided a stage for active diplomacy around the war in Ukraine. At a press conference concluding his China visit, Putin repeated that any settlement must reflect Moscow’s long-standing demands, including Ukraine’s abandonment of NATO ambitions, and said he was prepared to meet Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Moscow if “well-prepared” talks could yield results. Kyiv rejected Moscow as a venue. The Russian leader added that, failing a negotiated outcome, he would seek to achieve objectives “by force”.
Putin’s Beijing schedule also included a bilateral with Kim Jong-un. North Korea’s leader pledged to “help Russia with everything”, building on reports since early 2025 of North Korean troops and materiel supporting Russian operations, and on Pyongyang’s broader munitions pipeline to Russia. South Korean intelligence and Western reporting have estimated deployments in the many thousands, with further rotations possible.
Set against this, the United States sought to keep diplomatic channels open after an August summit in Alaska between President Donald Trump and Putin that produced no breakthrough. Washington has threatened additional measures while trying to broker direct talks; Trump has trailed further steps but has not unveiled new, sweeping Russia sanctions since the Anchorage meeting.
US–India trade tensions formed a conspicuous backdrop. In late August, the White House raised tariffs on most Indian goods to 50% in response to New Delhi’s purchases of discounted Russian oil — a move that strained relations with one of Washington’s key Indo-Pacific partners. By contrast, a temporary US–China “tariff truce” has capped certain China-bound rates below earlier peaks, producing the anomaly that India faces higher effective US duties than China for now.
The Tianjin–Beijing sequence also exposed frictions elsewhere. Although Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev was among the visiting leaders, there was no substantive bilateral with Putin; the Russian president later said the pair exchanged only “two or three words”, an indication of continuing strains in Moscow–Baku ties following recent regional shifts.
Three strategic threads emerge from the week.
First, Beijing’s capacity to convene — SCO summitry followed by a tightly scripted parade — allows China to frame a narrative of non-Western coordination even when participants’ interests diverge. Modi’s attendance at Tianjin but absence from the parade illustrated India’s hedging: engagement on multilateral security matters without endorsing Chinese military spectacle.
Second, Moscow used the setting to present continuity rather than compromise on Ukraine. Putin’s public invitation to Zelenskyy to come to Moscow, coupled with reiterated red lines, suggested no substantive shift in Russia’s terms. That stance sits alongside deepening military links with Pyongyang, from ammunition flows to reported troop deployments, which collectively support a strategy of attrition.
Third, Washington’s approach is now filtered through competing priorities: sustaining pressure on Russia, managing a complex China trade truce, and penalising India over Russian oil. The tariff step against India — arriving days before Tianjin — complicates US efforts to build a cohesive counter-weight in Asia, even as European allies press ahead with security guarantees for Ukraine and await clearer US direction after the Alaska summit’s inconclusive outcome.
SCO summit opens in Tianjin as Xi hosts Putin and Modi amid US–India tariff dispute
