Reuters’ reporting suggests that delayed orders, confused authority and basic equipment shortages slowed the military response during the hours when organised rescue mattered most.
Venezuela’s military response to the devastating June earthquakes was slowed by delayed orders, confused authority and shortages of basic equipment, according to a Reuters investigation citing eight sources familiar with the response.
The Reuters investigation found that troops were not deployed quickly enough in the crucial first days after the magnitude 7.2 and 7.5 earthquakes struck Venezuela’s coast on 24 June. The quakes killed about 5,000 people according to the government, while some experts have warned that the final toll may be higher.
The findings challenge the official account of an immediate 4,000-person deployment. Acting President Delcy Rodriguez has defended the government’s response and rejected criticism that authorities were slow or ineffective. Reuters reported, however, that residents, witnesses and sources said civilians led much of the initial rescue effort, using rudimentary tools before international teams, firefighters and a limited number of soldiers became more visible.
EU Global previously covered how the disaster tested Europe’s civil-protection reach. The new Reuters reporting advances the story by looking inside Venezuela’s own command system. It asks why a state that relies heavily on military structures was unable to convert that power into rapid civil-emergency capacity.
The answer, according to the sources cited by Reuters, was not a single failure. It involved delayed deployment orders, uncertainty over who was directing operations, limited communications, vehicle shortages and a lack of equipment such as hammers, pickaxes and helicopters equipped for night operations. One source said a Marine Infantry Brigade was ready to move but did not receive instructions.
That matters because disaster response is a test of operational readiness. Armed forces can be useful in earthquakes because they have manpower, logistics, transport, engineering capacity and command structures. But those advantages only matter if orders move quickly and units have the tools to act.
The earthquake struck on Army Day, a national holiday when many personnel were away from units. That may have compounded delays, but it does not fully explain the reported confusion. A credible emergency plan should include recall procedures, communication chains and preassigned roles for units closest to likely disaster zones.
Reuters also reported that overlapping authority may have contributed to uncertainty. Rodriguez named National Guard commander Juan Sulbaran Quintero as the single authority overseeing the response, while also issuing a decree granting powers to Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello. In a crisis, unclear authority can waste hours deciding who is responsible for sectors, equipment and incoming international teams.
The political consequence is severe. Governments often rely on armed forces to project competence after disasters. When soldiers arrive late or under-equipped, the image reverses. A militarised state can look powerful in ceremonies and internal security operations while proving weak in the practical work of saving civilians.
For international donors, the findings also matter. Assistance can be delayed or misdirected if local command structures cannot assign search sectors, manage access or communicate the scale of need. Humanitarian capability depends on domestic coordination as much as foreign generosity.
The Venezuelan government did not respond to Reuters’ request for comment, according to the report. Rodriguez has publicly defended the response. The evidence now needs scrutiny through parliamentary, judicial or independent inquiry, but Venezuela’s political environment makes that unlikely.
The disaster has therefore become a test of accountability as well as emergency management. The question is no longer only how many people died. It is whether lives were lost because institutions that were supposed to mobilise quickly lacked the orders, tools and authority to do so.
The international dimension adds pressure. Foreign rescue teams can bring expertise, dogs, equipment and medical capacity, but they need local authorities to clear access, assign zones and provide security. If the domestic chain of command is confused, external assistance may arrive without being used efficiently.
That matters for European civil protection planning. International assistance is often judged by how quickly donors mobilise, but the receiving state’s command capacity can be just as decisive. The Venezuelan case shows that civil-protection partnerships should assess not only what aid can be sent, but whether the affected state can absorb it during the first 48 hours.
The lesson is uncomfortable for any government that relies on military symbolism. Uniforms, parades and command titles do not equal readiness. Disaster response depends on maintenance, communications, transport, training and permission to act. Reuters’ reporting suggests those practical elements were exactly where Venezuela’s system faltered.
