Four years of war and economic isolation have increased Moscow’s reliance on Beijing for energy sales, trade and technology. Behind the public declarations of friendship, evidence of hard bargaining and mutual espionage points to a relationship shaped by dependence, competition and distrust.
Russia’s relationship with China has become increasingly unequal since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with Moscow more dependent on Beijing as an export market, supplier and diplomatic partner.
Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping continue to describe one another as trusted partners. Their governments have also preserved their shared opposition to US influence and expanded co-operation in energy, technology and international affairs.
Behind those declarations, however, the commercial balance has shifted in China’s favour. A recent examination of the relationship described Putin as the junior partner in an association transformed by the war and Russia’s subsequent isolation from Western markets.
The clearest evidence of China’s negotiating power is the proposed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. Moscow wants the route to carry up to 50 billion cubic metres of gas annually from the Yamal fields through Mongolia to China, partially replacing the European market that Gazprom has lost.
Putin travelled to Beijing in May hoping to advance the project. The visit produced more than 40 co-operation documents but no final oil or gas agreement. The Kremlin subsequently said the two sides had reached a general understanding on the pipeline’s route and construction arrangements.
Crucial issues remain unresolved. There is no agreed price, implementation timetable or firm contract. Chinese negotiators have reportedly demanded prices close to those charged within Russia, which would provide Beijing with heavily discounted supplies.
China can afford to wait. It obtains gas through domestic production, pipelines from Central Asia and Russia, and liquefied natural gas imports. Russia, by contrast, needs a large alternative customer for gas once sold to Europe.
The first Power of Siberia pipeline delivered 38.8 billion cubic metres to China in 2025. Although Russia and China plan to raise its annual volume to 44 billion cubic metres, this remains far below the record 177 billion cubic metres that Russia supplied to Europe annually in 2018 and 2019.
Energy has nevertheless become central to the relationship. China imported an average of 2.01 million barrels per day of Russian oil in 2025, equivalent to 20 per cent of its total crude imports. Russia was also China’s third-largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, behind Australia and Qatar, according to figures on the countries’ expanding energy ties.
The wider trade figures present a more complicated picture. Bilateral commerce reached a record in 2024 but fell by 6.9 per cent to $228.1 billion in 2025. Chinese exports to Russia declined by 9.9 per cent, while imports fell by 3.4 per cent.
This contraction does not reverse Russia’s structural dependence. China has supplied vehicles, electronics, industrial machinery and other goods after many Western companies left the Russian market. It has also continued buying Russian oil, coal and gas despite Western sanctions.
European authorities have identified Chinese-based entities in supply networks serving Russia’s defence industry. Under the EU’s 20th sanctions package, adopted in April, the Council said it had designated 16 entities in China and several other third countries for providing dual-use goods or weapons systems to Russia’s military-industrial complex. Beijing has repeatedly denied supplying weapons for the war.
Co-operation accompanied by espionage concerns
The public partnership has not removed mutual suspicion. An eight-page internal FSB planning document reportedly prepared in late 2023 or early 2024 described China as a serious intelligence threat to Russia.
The document was obtained by a Western intelligence service and its authenticity was assessed by several Western agencies before its contents were reported in June 2025. Neither the Kremlin nor Beijing confirmed it publicly.
According to the document, the FSB launched a counter-intelligence programme codenamed Intesa-4 shortly before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It accused Chinese intelligence of attempting to recruit Russian officials, scientists, business figures and journalists, particularly those experiencing financial difficulties.
The reported Chinese targets included Russian military technology, information about operations in Ukraine, Arctic development and activity in Russia’s Far East. The document also alleged that Beijing was monitoring Russian citizens studying or working in China.
More recent reporting indicates that China is simultaneously cultivating relationships with Russian officials and elites beyond Putin’s immediate circle. This appears intended to preserve Beijing’s influence through any eventual transition of power rather than to depend exclusively on the personal relationship between Xi and Putin.
Such activity does not demonstrate that China controls Russian institutions or is preparing to annex Russian territory. It does, however, show that the partnership coexists with conventional intelligence competition and uncertainty about Russia’s longer-term political direction.
China has an interest in preventing either a Russian collapse or a future strategic turn towards the West. A weakened but functioning Russia offers discounted commodities, strategic depth and diplomatic support. An uncontrolled crisis could threaten Chinese investments, disrupt energy supplies and introduce instability along their border of more than 4,000 kilometres.
The relationship is therefore neither an equal alliance nor evidence of Chinese control over Russia. Moscow retains nuclear forces, natural resources, military capabilities and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. These assets make Russia valuable to Beijing.
Yet the imbalance is clear. Russia needs Chinese markets, goods and political support more urgently than China needs Russia. The Power of Siberia 2 negotiations show how Beijing can convert that dependence into commercial leverage, while the reported intelligence activity reveals the distrust concealed by the language of a “no-limits” partnership.
