The ambassadors of Britain, France and Germany have held talks with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin in Moscow, in a rare direct contact between the three European powers and the Russian foreign ministry over the war in Ukraine.
The meeting, held on 11 June, followed a recent London gathering at which the leaders of the three countries met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and reaffirmed support for efforts to bring about a ceasefire and direct negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow. The Moscow contact was therefore not an isolated diplomatic gesture. It formed part of a wider attempt by the so-called E3 to maintain European influence over the next phase of Ukraine diplomacy.
The contact also exposes a persistent question for Europe: who has the authority to speak to Moscow on Ukraine, and on what basis?
Britain is no longer a member of the European Union, but remains one of Ukraine’s most important European military backers. France and Germany are the EU’s two largest member states and central actors in European diplomacy. Together, the three capitals have the weight to conduct high-level coordination. Yet the E3 format does not represent the European Union as a whole, nor does it automatically reflect the positions of countries closer to Russia’s border, including Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania.
That tension matters because Ukraine diplomacy is not only about negotiations with Moscow. It is also about European unity, sanctions, military support, frozen Russian assets, future security guarantees and the role of the United States. Any European channel to Russia will be judged not only by whether it produces movement from Moscow, but by whether it strengthens or weakens the wider coalition supporting Ukraine.
According to the Russian foreign ministry’s account of the meeting, Galuzin accused Britain, France and Germany of pursuing a “destructive policy” over the war and of encouraging continued conflict through their support for Kyiv. That language is consistent with Moscow’s wider effort to portray European military and financial assistance to Ukraine as an obstacle to peace rather than a response to Russia’s invasion.
For the E3, the purpose is different. Their recent statement with Zelenskyy backed direct dialogue between Ukraine and Russia with active American and European participation, as part of efforts to secure a ceasefire and further negotiations. That position is intended to show that European support for diplomacy does not mean pressure on Ukraine to accept Russian terms.
The problem is that Moscow has repeatedly sought to divide Western governments by treating some European actors as more acceptable interlocutors than others. It has also tried to cast the EU as subordinate to Washington while presenting individual European contacts as evidence of diplomatic pressure on Kyiv. Any E3 engagement therefore carries risk. It may keep a channel open, but it also gives Moscow an opportunity to frame European diplomacy in its own terms.
There is a second risk inside Europe. Smaller and eastern member states have long objected to formats that appear to allow a few major capitals to shape policy on Russia above their heads. Their concern is not only procedural. For countries that see Russia as an immediate security threat, the details of ceasefire conditions, security guarantees and sanctions enforcement are matters of national security.
That does not make E3 contact with Moscow illegitimate. Diplomacy often requires formats smaller than the EU’s full institutional machinery. The Union itself can be slow to act where unanimity, internal divisions or formal procedure limit speed. France, Germany and Britain also bring military, diplomatic and intelligence capacity that few other European states can match.
But any E3 initiative will need to be anchored in a broader European position if it is to avoid becoming a source of friction. A contact channel with Moscow is useful only if it reinforces the central principle that Ukraine must be part of any settlement concerning its territory and security. It must also remain consistent with the EU’s sanctions policy and with NATO’s approach to deterrence and support.
The meeting comes as Europe is trying to define its role alongside the United States. President Donald Trump has sought to position Washington as a central broker in efforts to end the war, while European leaders have argued that any negotiation must involve Ukraine and cannot leave Europe as a bystander in decisions affecting its own security order.
This is where the E3 format has practical appeal. It allows London, Paris and Berlin to move quickly, coordinate with Washington and Kyiv, and test whether Moscow is prepared to engage beyond public messaging. It also allows Europe to signal that it remains diplomatically active even as US policy becomes more central to the negotiation track.
The question is whether that activity amounts to influence. Russia has so far shown little sign of accepting terms that would meet Ukraine’s core requirements on sovereignty and security. Its criticism of European involvement suggests that Moscow may prefer to engage with Washington while dismissing European capitals as parties to the conflict.
For Ukraine, the decisive issue will be whether European diplomacy produces additional pressure on Russia or merely creates another layer of negotiation. Kyiv has consistently argued that diplomacy must be backed by military support, sanctions and security guarantees. A ceasefire without enforcement or credible guarantees would risk freezing the war on terms favourable to Moscow.
The E3 meeting in Moscow therefore should not be read as a breakthrough. It is better understood as a test of European positioning. Britain, France and Germany want to remain central to any diplomatic process over Ukraine. Russia wants to challenge their credibility and divide the Western approach. Other European states will watch closely to see whether the format strengthens collective policy or narrows it to a small group of major capitals.
The contact may prove useful if it clarifies positions and keeps Moscow under pressure to respond to proposals backed by Ukraine’s partners. It will be damaging if it creates the impression that Europe’s larger powers are exploring diplomacy without sufficient involvement from Kyiv and the rest of Europe.
The issue will remain on the EU agenda when foreign ministers discuss Ukraine at the next Foreign Affairs Council. That setting will matter because the E3 channel can only carry wider European weight if it is linked to an agreed EU approach on sanctions, military support and Ukraine’s security.
For now, the Moscow meeting shows less about peace prospects than about Europe’s unresolved diplomatic structure. The war in Ukraine has forced Europe to act collectively, but the channels of influence remain uneven. The E3 can speak to Moscow. The harder question is whether it can speak for Europe.
