The latest exchange of strikes between the United States and Iran has returned Europe’s energy security to the centre of the Middle East crisis, as oil prices rose and uncertainty deepened over the Strait of Hormuz.
According to Reuters, the United States said it had carried out strikes on Iranian military targets along Iran’s Gulf coast after what it described as aggressive Iranian action, including the downing of a US MQ-1 drone. US Central Command said American aircraft hit Iranian air defences, a ground-control station and attack drones which it said posed threats to ships in regional waters. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards later said they had targeted an air base used by the United States, without identifying the base.
The exchange came despite continuing efforts to reduce tensions and keep open the possibility of a political settlement. Reuters reported that Kuwait’s air defences intercepted missiles and drones, with sirens sounding across the country. The incidents underscored the risk that military escalation around the Gulf could rapidly involve not only US and Iranian forces, but also neighbouring states and energy infrastructure.
For Europe, the most immediate consequence is the oil market. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. The US Energy Information Administration has described the Strait of Hormuz as the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint, with flows in 2022 averaging 21 million barrels per day, equivalent to about 21 per cent of global petroleum liquids consumption. Any renewed disruption there has consequences far beyond the Gulf.
The market reaction reflected that vulnerability. The Wall Street Journal reported that Brent crude rose more than 3 per cent after the US-Iran strikes, with traders again pricing in risk around Hormuz and uncertainty over whether a diplomatic deal could reopen the route fully. Reuters had earlier reported that oil prices had been volatile on conflicting signals over a possible end to the conflict and the reopening of shipping through the strait.
Europe’s exposure is not limited to crude oil. Higher oil prices feed into transport costs, aviation, shipping, agriculture and industrial production. They also influence inflation expectations at a time when European governments are still managing the economic effects of the energy shock that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Even where Europe does not import most of its oil directly from the Gulf, global pricing means European consumers and businesses are still affected.
The International Energy Agency’s May oil market report showed how much the crisis has already changed market assumptions. The agency said global oil supply had declined further in April, with output from Gulf countries affected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz 14.4 million barrels per day below pre-war levels. It projected lower global supply for 2026 on the assumption that flows through the strait would gradually resume from June. The latest strikes make that assumption less secure.
The political problem for Europe is that energy security is again being shaped by events outside its direct control. Since 2022, the EU has reduced its reliance on Russian fossil fuels, expanded liquefied natural gas imports, increased storage obligations and accelerated some renewable-energy plans. Those changes have improved resilience, but they have not removed Europe’s exposure to global oil and gas volatility. A Gulf crisis can still reach European households through fuel prices, freight costs and inflation.
There is also a diplomatic dimension. The United States remains the main external security actor in the Gulf, while European states have more limited military leverage in the region. At the same time, Europe has a direct interest in keeping shipping routes open, preventing a broader regional war and avoiding another inflationary energy shock. This creates a familiar imbalance: Europe is economically exposed, but strategically dependent on decisions made elsewhere.
That imbalance matters because the Middle East crisis is unfolding alongside the war in Ukraine and rising tension in the Indo-Pacific. US military and diplomatic attention is being pulled across several theatres. If Washington is forced to devote greater resources to the Gulf, European governments may face further pressure to take on more responsibility for their own security and for Ukraine’s defence.
The present escalation should not be read as proof that a wider regional war is inevitable. Negotiations may still reduce the immediate risk. Shipping through Hormuz may recover if a credible deal is reached. Oil prices could fall again if traders conclude that disruption will be limited.
But the latest exchange has shown how fragile those assumptions remain. A drone incident, a retaliatory strike, an air-defence interception or an attack on a base can quickly move energy markets and alter political calculations. For Europe, that means the Gulf is not a distant theatre. It is a direct factor in inflation, industrial costs, transport, defence planning and the wider question of strategic dependence.
The central lesson is that European energy security cannot be measured only by storage levels or import contracts. It also depends on maritime chokepoints, US-Iran diplomacy, Gulf air defence, tanker traffic and the capacity of global markets to absorb shocks. The latest US-Iran exchange has made that dependence visible again.
