Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s visit to Kyiv comes as Ukraine watches Belarus more closely, amid concern that Moscow could use its ally’s territory to widen pressure on Ukraine’s northern border.
Belarus has returned to the centre of Ukraine’s security calculations after exiled opposition leader c visited Kyiv amid renewed Ukrainian concern that Russia could seek to involve Minsk more directly in the war.
Tsikhanouskaya’s visit followed weeks of warnings from Ukrainian officials that Belarus could again become a platform for Russian military pressure. The visit was politically significant because Kyiv has often been cautious in its engagement with the Belarusian opposition, balancing support for democratic forces with the immediate security risk posed by the Belarusian state’s alignment with Moscow.
Belarus has not sent its own regular forces into Ukraine. However, its territory was used by Russia during the opening phase of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, when Russian troops advanced towards Kyiv from the north. Since then, Minsk has continued to provide Russia with strategic depth, logistical access and political support, while avoiding direct participation in combat.
That balance is now again under scrutiny. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that Russia may be examining scenarios involving renewed pressure from the Belarusian direction. Ukraine has therefore been reinforcing its northern defences and assessing the risk of a new operation aimed at stretching Ukrainian forces away from the eastern and southern fronts.
The concern is not based only on troop movements. Belarus has hosted Russian military activity, including exercises involving nuclear-capable systems, and remains closely integrated with Moscow’s security posture. President Alexander Lukashenko has denied that Belarus intends to be drawn into the war, but has also said that Minsk and Moscow would defend themselves together in the event of aggression. Lukashenko made those comments while visiting a missile brigade.
For Kyiv, the problem is that Belarus does not need to launch a full-scale offensive to affect the war. Even the credible threat of action from the north can force Ukraine to hold troops, air-defence assets and engineering resources away from other areas. It can also complicate the defence of Kyiv, Chernihiv and border regions already exposed to Russian missile and drone attacks.
The timing has sharpened the issue. Ukraine has faced another period of intense Russian missile and drone strikes, including attacks on Kyiv. Ukrainian concern over Belarus has grown as Russia continues to use missile pressure and as Belarus remains a potential staging area close to both Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank.
Tsikhanouskaya used her Kyiv visit to argue that a democratic Belarus would contribute to regional security. Her position reflects a wider message from the Belarusian opposition: that the current regime’s dependence on Moscow has made Belarus a security problem for its neighbours, while a different political order in Minsk would reduce Russia’s ability to use Belarusian territory against Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha met Tsikhanouskaya in Kyiv and has previously described Belarus as being pulled deeper into Russia’s war. The Belarusian opposition leader’s official website said she held a joint press conference with Sybiha and honoured fallen Ukrainians at Kyiv’s Wall of Remembrance during the visit.
The diplomatic aspect is also important. France has recently held direct contact with Lukashenko, with President Emmanuel Macron warning against deeper Belarusian involvement in the war. For Ukraine, such contacts are sensitive. They may be intended to prevent escalation, but they also raise the question of whether Minsk is seeking sanctions relief or diplomatic space while continuing to support Russia’s military position.
The United States has also reportedly explored whether easing restrictions on Belarusian potash could reduce Minsk’s dependence on Moscow. Kyiv is likely to view such discussions with caution. Belarusian potash remains an important economic lever, but any relaxation of pressure would be politically difficult while Belarus continues to serve as Russia’s military partner.
For Europe, the renewed focus on Belarus has three consequences. First, it reinforces the link between the war in Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank, particularly Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Secondly, it shows that sanctions against Minsk remain part of the wider response to Russia’s war, rather than a separate human-rights file. Thirdly, it raises the question of whether Western diplomacy should aim to deter Lukashenko, isolate him, or create incentives to prevent deeper military involvement.
The risk should not be overstated. There is no public evidence that Belarusian forces are preparing an immediate full-scale attack on Ukraine. Lukashenko has repeatedly tried to preserve room for manoeuvre by supporting Moscow while avoiding the direct costs of joining the war. But Ukraine cannot ignore a northern border that has already been used once as an invasion route.
Tsikhanouskaya’s visit therefore matters because it places Belarus back in the diplomatic and military frame. For Kyiv, Belarus is not only an authoritarian neighbour aligned with Moscow. It is a potential operational platform, a sanctions issue, a pressure point for Russia, and a political question for Europe’s eastern security order.
