Somaliland, a self-declared state on the Gulf of Aden, has moved sharply up the international agenda after Israel became the first UN member to recognise it as independent and sovereign.
The decision, announced on 26 December 2025, prompted immediate objections from Somalia and criticism from the African Union, and has revived long-running arguments over borders, maritime security and external competition in the Horn of Africa.
On 6 January 2026, Israel’s foreign minister, Gideon Sa’ar, travelled to Hargeisa and met Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. Sa’ar discussed expanding bilateral relations, including co-operation in agriculture, health, technology and economic development, and carried an invitation from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for Abdullahi to visit Israel. Somalia’s foreign ministry denounced the trip as a violation of its sovereignty, reiterating that Somaliland remains part of Somalia.
The African Union’s Political Affairs, Peace and Security Council called for Israel to revoke its recognition, describing Somaliland as a “so-called” republic and framing the move as a unilateral step that could increase regional tensions. The AU position follows its long-standing emphasis on the territorial integrity of member states and its reluctance to endorse secessionist outcomes, even where de facto authorities have operated for decades.
Somaliland declared independence in 1991 after the collapse of Somalia’s central government, presenting itself as the successor to the former British Somaliland Protectorate. Since then it has developed its own institutions, security forces and currency, and has held elections that international observers have often characterised as comparatively orderly by regional standards. International Crisis Group has described Somaliland as a consolidating democracy with a reputation for political stability, while also warning at different points of political strain and institutional pressures.
In November 2024, Somaliland held a presidential election in which opposition leader Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as “Cirro”, defeated incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi. Abdullahi’s victory paved the way for a transfer of power and reinforced Somaliland’s claim that it functions as a state in practice, even without formal recognition from most of the international community.
Israel’s decision has been presented by analysts primarily through the lens of geography. Somaliland sits close to the Bab el-Mandeb and the junction between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, a corridor that has been central to global shipping and has recently faced sustained disruption linked to Houthi attacks from Yemen. Berbera, Somaliland’s main port, lies near key shipping lanes and has drawn increasing foreign attention as maritime threats have risen.
The economic logic of Somaliland’s pitch to external partners has long centred on Berbera and the “Berbera corridor” linking the coast to Ethiopia. Dubai’s DP World launched a project to expand Berbera port in 2018, part of wider Emirati involvement in port infrastructure and logistics across the region. Somali officials have repeatedly criticised such arrangements, arguing that deals made with Somaliland bypass Mogadishu’s authority.
Ethiopia’s interest has been even more politically sensitive. On 1 January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland to gain access to the sea via Berbera, a move Somaliland officials said would be linked to Ethiopian recognition, while Somalia rejected the agreement as having no legal force. The dispute contributed to a deterioration in Somalia–Ethiopia relations, with Somalia taking steps to nullify the deal domestically and raising the risk of wider regional alignment against Addis Ababa. In December 2024 Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to work together to resolve the dispute, following talks involving Turkey.
Israel’s entry into the recognition question adds a new dimension to these dynamics. Somaliland officials have publicly denied claims that recognition is linked to hosting foreign military bases or to proposals involving the relocation of Palestinians from Gaza. Reuters noted such denials in reporting on Sa’ar’s visit, as speculation circulated around the strategic uses of Somaliland’s coastline and port facilities.
Somalia, meanwhile, has taken up the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council for January 2026. While the presidency is procedural, it gives Mogadishu a prominent platform during a month of international attention, including press briefings on the Council’s work programme. For Somalia’s government, the timing intersects with a renewed need to mobilise diplomatic support for its territorial claims as the Somaliland issue gains visibility.
For Somaliland, recognition by a single country does not resolve its core problem: most states still treat it as a region of Somalia, and multilateral institutions continue to seat Somalia as the recognised sovereign. Israel’s decision nevertheless changes the baseline by creating a precedent that other governments may be asked to follow or reject.
