A long-anticipated telephone conversation between China’s leader Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump has not produced a material normalisation of relations between Beijing and Washington. Despite optimistic messaging from both capitals, the two governments remain at odds across political and economic fronts.
Expectations around the call centred on setting dates for a presidential visit by Mr Trump to the People’s Republic of China. Prior to the conversation, there was speculation that such a trip could take place within months and be used to address outstanding economic issues.
Following the call, the indicative timeline has shifted: Mr Trump is now signalling a visit to China no earlier than early 2026, and the visit may not take place at all. A face-to-face meeting between the two leaders could occur instead on the margins of forthcoming summits, with reporting pointing to October’s ASEAN meetings in Malaysia and November’s APEC leaders’ meeting in South Korea.
The call reportedly included discussion of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Both sides referred to the importance of ending the conflict, but no details were released regarding any shared approach, potential steps, or the substance of China’s position. The absence of specifics suggests there were no agreed measures that would indicate the emergence of a joint US–China stance on the war.
Mr Trump said the leaders addressed a range of complex topics and indicated areas of possible agreement. He referenced progress towards an agreement relating to TikTok. However, China’s official communications were more guarded, and independent reporting noted that no final deal had been confirmed.
Beijing’s readout struck a different note on trade. Chinese statements have reiterated opposition to unilateral actions in international commerce and urged the United States to avoid new restrictive measures. The central dispute in US–China economic relations — tariffs imposed by Washington on Chinese goods and corresponding Chinese measures on US exports — remains unresolved. Recent coverage indicates Beijing has criticised US proposals to leverage tariffs in response to China’s purchases of Russian oil. On present indications, any leaders’ meeting this autumn is unlikely, by itself, to resolve this dispute.
The structural drivers of tension remain clear. The United States is seeking to reduce a persistent bilateral trade deficit and to address perceived dependencies in critical supply chains. China is focused on consolidating its international position, including through relationships with partners such as the Russian Federation. These objectives point in different directions and constrain the scope for compromise in the short term.
Energy trade adds a further layer of difficulty. The United States has argued that China’s purchases of Russian crude and refined products provide Moscow with revenue that sustains its war against Ukraine. Publicly available trade and sanctions-monitoring data show China has been the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels through 2025. The question is what leverage Washington can credibly bring to bear to alter Beijing’s energy procurement.
Additional US tariffs aimed at curbing China’s imports of Russian oil would be unlikely to have direct effect on the flow of those commodities, and earlier tariff escalations on Chinese goods have been postponed or diluted. The administration faces a decision on alternative tools if it concludes that trade measures will not shift China’s energy stance.
European governments are also implicated. The US has urged European partners to adopt stricter approaches towards Russian oil flows to large buyers in Asia, including China and India. The practical challenge remains how to influence purchases routed through third countries and complex shipping arrangements when the United States itself has limited means to compel change in China’s behaviour. Without a coordinated framework on enforcement and a credible set of incentives or penalties, the scope for rapid adjustment appears limited.
For the White House, the immediate focus continues to be the trade imbalance with China. That imbalance is resistant to change through statements and tariff schedules alone. Proposals to relocate manufacturing from China to the United States have not, to date, produced large-scale movements of production. Diversification to other economies in the global south is more visible, but that dynamic carries its own consequences: expanded industrial activity in countries such as India is likely to be supported by competitively priced energy imports, including from Russia.
Several additional questions therefore remain open. Can the two sides devise a tariff arrangement that de-escalates without being perceived domestically as a concession? What instruments, if any, could alter China’s energy procurement from Russia? How far are US partners in Europe prepared to go in secondary enforcement? And can any leader-level engagement — whether in Beijing, Washington or at a multilateral summit — generate the political space needed for incremental agreements on technology, data, and market access?
There is little evidence, at this stage, that a single visit or summit would resolve these issues. Notably, the two sides have not agreed dates for a reciprocal visit by Xi to the United States, in contrast with his November 2023 engagement with President Joe Biden in California, which was scheduled well in advance. Absent movement on tariff fundamentals, US–China disagreements are likely to persist and accumulate across the trade, technology and security domains.
