China and Russia have concluded a five-day series of joint naval patrols in the waters off Vladivostok, deepening military cooperation between the two authoritarian powers and delivering what many in the West see as a provocative signal of growing strategic alignment.
The patrols, conducted between 31 July and 5 August, featured live-fire exercises and anti-submarine warfare drills involving a flotilla of destroyers and frigates. Notably among them were China’s Type 052D destroyers Shaoxing and Urumqi, alongside Russia’s Admiral Tributs, a Soviet-era Udaloy-class destroyer refurbished for modern operations.
The manoeuvres, held under the banner of “maritime security and stability”, were praised effusively by Chinese state media as a testament to Beijing and Moscow’s “strategic mutual trust”. In reality, analysts argue, they represent a sharp escalation of great-power signalling in a region already burdened by rising military tensions.
While China and Russia have conducted joint naval exercises before, this week’s operation stood out for both its location—within striking range of the contested waters of the Sea of Japan and Northern Pacific—and its tactical complexity. Multiple passes by combat aircraft, real-time electronic warfare simulations, and shared command centres marked a clear shift from symbolic cooperation to operational integration.
The drills drew immediate concern in Washington and Tokyo, where military planners have long feared a deepening of strategic coordination between the two Eurasian giants. Yet it is Canberra that finds itself newly exposed.
Albanese Under Fire
Back home in Australia, the joint patrols have ignited a political storm. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, fresh from a G20 summit in New Delhi where China’s President Xi Jinping notably declined a bilateral meeting, has been accused by opposition parties of “strategic timidity” and “abdication of leadership”.
Liberal defence spokesman Senator Andrew Hastie declared the government’s response “alarmingly muted” given the scale and proximity of the drills. “China and Russia are rehearsing wartime operations in our region,” he said in a press conference yesterday. “And the Prime Minister offers nothing but silence. This is not the posture of a serious regional power.”
The Albanese government, for its part, issued only a brief statement through the Department of Defence, acknowledging the exercises and calling for “all nations to respect freedom of navigation and regional stability”. No minister has yet fronted the press to address the issue directly.
The timing is particularly awkward. Just last month, Australia committed to purchasing 11 Japanese-built Mogami-class frigates as part of a sweeping naval upgrade—a deal intended to project strength and deepen Indo-Pacific ties. Critics now argue that hardware alone is insufficient without assertive diplomacy.
A New Axis?
Behind the political point-scoring lies a far more serious concern: that the China–Russia alignment is no longer a marriage of convenience but an emerging strategic axis, capable of coordinating military pressure across Eurasia.
“In past years, joint exercises were largely symbolic—flag-waving events with limited operational overlap,” said Professor Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security College at the Australian National University. “What we’re seeing now is far more integrated. These are rehearsals for high-end conflict. And Australia, by geography and alliance, is in the frame.”
Indeed, the choice of Vladivostok as the launch point for the patrols is no accident. It positions the joint fleet within operational reach of Japan, South Korea, and U.S. Pacific Command in Guam, while simultaneously reinforcing Moscow’s narrative of pivoting eastward in response to Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation over Ukraine.
Beijing, for its part, gains a convenient partner to demonstrate strength in numbers—particularly useful as its relations with both the Philippines and Taiwan remain brittle following a series of maritime clashes and stepped-up U.S. naval patrols through the Taiwan Strait.
“It’s the optics as much as the ordnance,” said Dr Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University. “China gets to signal that it is not isolated, that it can operate with other great powers, and that it has friends who are also enemies of the U.S.-led order.”
Australia’s Strategic Dilemma
Faced with this challenge, Australia finds itself in an unenviable position—caught between its geographic proximity to the Indo-Pacific’s flashpoints and a longstanding reliance on alliance guarantees from Washington.
The AUKUS pact and Quad engagements offer some reassurance, yet doubts persist about whether Australia’s political leadership is prepared to act with the urgency the times demand.
A recent intelligence review by ASIO highlighted an uptick in cyber espionage and interference campaigns linked to foreign powers—many targeting Australian defence contractors and academic institutions involved in AUKUS-related research. The same week, Defence Minister Richard Marles was criticised for failing to deliver a promised review of maritime defence capabilities by the end of July.
Meanwhile, China’s Global Times, a Communist Party mouthpiece, took an unsubtle swipe at Canberra, suggesting Australia had “chosen decline over defiance” and describing its foreign policy as “anchored to American decline”.
Whether this is bluster or battlefield shaping remains to be seen. But one thing is increasingly clear: the Indo-Pacific is no longer a region of speculative threats. It is the front line of strategic contest—and Australia, willingly or not, is a participant.
Main Image: kremlin.ru
This Article Originally Appeared on DEFENCE MATTERS.EU
