Donald Trump allegedly threatened to bomb Moscow and Beijing during his first presidential term should Russia attack Ukraine or China initiate conflict over Taiwan.
The statements, reportedly made during a private meeting with campaign donors shortly before the 2024 US presidential election, have reignited debate over Trump’s approach to deterrence and his assertions regarding the war in Ukraine.
According to leaked excerpts from that conversation, Trump claimed he warned President Vladimir Putin that any aggression towards Ukraine could prompt a US military strike against the Russian capital. Similarly, he is said to have told Chinese President Xi Jinping that an invasion of Taiwan would risk a direct attack on Beijing. Trump reportedly described these threats as part of an effective strategy to deter military escalation by the two powers.
“Putin didn’t believe me at first,” Trump allegedly said during the donor meeting, “but I think he started to consider that I might actually do it.” Regarding Xi, Trump added that the Chinese leader may have believed him to be irrational, which he viewed as an advantage in projecting unpredictability.
These claims, if accurately reported, offer insight into Trump’s self-perceived role in preventing the outbreak of major conflicts during his time in office. They also reflect his longstanding assertion that had he remained president, Russia would not have launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In Trump’s view, the credibility of his threats placed Putin in a position where the risks of military action outweighed the potential benefits.
Following President Joe Biden’s inauguration, however, Trump claims Putin saw a return to traditional diplomacy in Washington—less inclined to engage in brinkmanship and more cautious about risking a nuclear exchange. Trump argues that this change emboldened Russia to proceed with its military campaign in Ukraine.
Analysts have noted that Trump’s comments appear to conflate coercive diplomacy with personal bravado. Although deterrence has historically played a central role in US security doctrine, openly threatening to strike nuclear-armed capitals remains highly contentious and arguably destabilising. Russia possesses the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear warheads, and any US attack on Moscow would likely provoke retaliation against American cities and military installations.
The hypothetical scenario outlined by Trump—escalating to direct attacks on Moscow or Beijing—raises the spectre of strategic nuclear conflict. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Western leaders have generally sought to avoid such escalatory risks, focusing instead on military aid to Ukraine and economic sanctions on Russia.
Trump has also suggested that his method of deterrence would apply to China, should it act against Taiwan. The prospect of a US-China war over the island has gained greater salience amid rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific. Trump’s reported claim of threatening Beijing reflects an attempt to portray himself as uniquely capable of preventing conflict through personal resolve.
However, the substance of these alleged threats and the extent to which Putin or Xi took them seriously remains unclear. Trump’s framing of events relies on the assumption that both adversaries believed he would follow through with extreme military action. Whether such perceptions actually influenced Russian or Chinese policy decisions is unverified.
In the same donor meeting, Trump is reported to have acknowledged that ending the war in Ukraine after its outbreak is significantly harder than preventing it from occurring in the first place. He expressed frustration over the limitations of diplomacy once full-scale conflict is underway. He also suggested that his efforts to convince Putin to agree to a ceasefire were aimed at drawing Russia into a protracted negotiation, which in turn might prevent further territorial ambitions against Ukraine.
According to Trump’s account, however, Putin recognised the risk of being ensnared in a political trap that could frustrate his strategic objective: the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and integration of its territory into the Russian Federation. Consequently, Moscow continued its offensive, seeking to apply military pressure on Ukraine and demoralise its population.
Trump’s broader challenge now, should he return to office, would be to demonstrate that he is not merely issuing rhetorical threats, but is prepared to impose real costs on Russia for continued aggression. Whether such measures would involve economic sanctions, expanded military assistance to Ukraine, or other direct actions remains to be seen.
There are also concerns that if Trump fails to project credible deterrence, other adversaries—notably China—may conclude that the United States lacks the will to enforce its red lines. The risk of a wider conflict, potentially involving simultaneous theatres in Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific, has been cited by defence analysts as a scenario requiring urgent strategic planning.
Should war break out over Taiwan, and if Trump were president, he would face decisions not just over material support but over the possible deployment of US forces in combat. The hypothetical convergence of Russian and Chinese ambitions against Western-aligned states could result in a major geopolitical crisis, with consequences for NATO and global stability.
Ultimately, Trump’s approach—rooted in personal assertion, unpredictability, and deterrence through fear—continues to shape debate about US foreign policy in an increasingly multipolar and confrontational world. Whether this approach provides stability or accelerates the path towards conflict will depend on how adversaries assess its credibility and how allies respond to its implications.
